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It is hardly surprising that lawyers do not attach much, if any,
weight to considerations of resource allocation when they direct their
attention to securities markets problems. In their encounters with the
securities markets, malfunctions loom large. Securities transactions
are rarely dealt with in the courts unless damage has been incurred
because the price of securities failed to reflect their "proper" value.
Lawyers are on guard against manipulation and other actions designed
to prevent one of the parties to a transaction from being aware of the
value of the security involved. Of the millions of transactions that
occur daily, the lawyer focuses on the few improper ones, and their
importance in the market as a whole is magnified. In the lawyer's
training, no significant attention is given to the evaluation of capital
investment proposals. The lawyer seems unaware of the importance of
securities markets in allocating resources. He knows that business is
not very dependent on the capital markets for funds. Thus, it is
natural for him to overlook the effects of securities regulation on
resource allocation.
Lawyers are misguided in these respects. There is evidence that
the capital markets do a reasonably good job of keeping the prices of
securities in line with their earning power and riskiness, and that the
capital markets do indeed influence capital expenditures. In a recent
article,' I argued that management does weigh the impact of capital
expenditures on the market value of a corporation's securities, and is
* The subject of this review is INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, by
Henry G. Manne. New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 274. $6.95.
t Associate Professor of Finance, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1946, Queens
University (Canada). Ph.D. 1950, Cornell University.
I Mendelson, Payout Policy and Resource Allocation, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 377
(1968). It should be noted that this article on payout policy is itself evidence that
some lawyers feel that capital markets influence resource allocation. The problem
dealt with in the article was posed to me by members of the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School faculty. The Wharton School and the Law School of the University
of Pennsylvania are currently exploring the possibility of offering a joint course in
the economics and law of securities regulation so that the effect of securities regulation
on resource allocation and other problems involving both economics and law will not be
overlooked. For another expression of concern in this area, see Mundheim, Book
Review, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1101 (1966). It should be noted that the University of
Chicago Law School has been publishing The Journal of Law and Economics since
1958.
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sensitive to the cost of funds implied in the market's evaluation of its
securities. The capital markets influence capital expenditures through
the relationship of the market cost of funds to the merits of investment
proposals considered. Although some securities are not properly
priced in relation to their earning power and riskiness, such mispricing
is the exception rather than the rule. If mispricing were truly common,
investors with adequate research resources would be able to select the
underpriced securities and realize a rate of return superior to that
earned on the market as a whole. But the systematic investigations
made to date have turned up no convincing evidence that the investment
institutions with such resources consistently realize a superior return.'
Although it is tempting to interpret such findings as a reflection on the
quality of the research departments of institutional investors, I prefer
the more charitable interpretation that attributes the failure of the re-
search departments to perform better to the efficacy with which the
capital markets price securities. In general, mispricing is corrected with
such speed that the opportunity to realize rates of return above the
average is limited.'
To Henry Manne's credit, when he addressed himself to the ques-
tion of insider trading and brought economic analysis to bear upon the
problem,4 he included considerations of resource allocation. However,
when one carefully scrutinizes the implications of insider trading for
resource allocation, one does not find, as Manne did, that the legal
restraints on insider trading are unjustified. To the contrary, one finds
that the restraints are inadequate and that there is little economic justi-
fication for insider trading, for any investment by officers in the shares
of their company, or for the repurchase of common stock by the com-
pany itself.
I argue below that insider trading is harmful to the normal opera-
tion of the securities markets in allocating resources. In developing my
argument, I describe what I think are the economic consequences of
2 See, e.g., I. FRIEND, F. BROWN, E. HERMAN & D. VIcKzRs, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, 294-358 (1962). Friend &
Vickers, Portfolio Selection and Investment Performance, 22 J. FIN 391 (1965);
Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966). For a contrary view, see
Cohen and Pogue, An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative Portfolio Selection Models,
40 J. Bus. 169 (1967).
3 Of course in the short run the market as a whole may be inflated or depressed,
and rates of return will vary from the average.
4 H. MANNF, INsIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MAIKEr (1966) [hereinafter cited
as MANNE].
Manne also considers the legal and equitable grounds for the prohibition of insider
trading. As an economist I have a special interest in Manne's economic arguments,
and my discussion will be confined to them. For an excellent treatment of the other
elements in Manne's thesis, see Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 U. VA. L. Rzv. 1425 (1967).
In this paper I do not deal with the propriety of security firms simultaneously
making a market in a security and having a representative on the board of directors of
the issuer. This is a problem that arises largely in connection with over-the-counter
securities and involves special considerations that were apparently sufficiently weighty
to induce the SEC to refrain from asking that such directorships be brought within
the scope of § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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insider trading in part I. In part II, I examine the merits of Professor
Manne's contention that the outsider suffers no economic harm from
insider trading. His case depends upon a view of the stock market that
I find to be distorted. After examining Professor Manne's theory of
the stock market in part III, I demonstrate in part IV that even under
his theory, insider trading results in net damage to the stockholder. In
part V, I examine and reject his contention that the opportunity for
insider trading provides necessary compensation for the entrepreneur.
Finally, in part VI, I discuss Professor Manne's argument that the
existence of a market for information makes it impossible to prohibit
insider trading effectively, and point out the reasons why this argument
is unconvincing.
I. THE EcoNomic CONSEQUENCES OF INSIDER TRADING
Cutting through a maze of complicated qualifications, we may say
that resources are optimally allocated when no alternative allocation
would improve the economic well-being of the community. Error in-
troduced by the decision-making processes makes it unlikely that perfect
allocation of resources can be achieved except by chance. However, if
there are no biases in the allocative mechanisms, misallocations will be
random. At times too many resources will be allocated to one industry,
and too few to others. But given a properly functioning economic
system, there will be nothing in the decision-making process itself that
will persistently allocate an excessive quantity of resources to any one
industry. Insider trading is harmful from an economic point of view
because it introduces a specific bias, and thus contributes to a persistent
misallocation of resources.
The Source of Insider Trading Profits
Within the framework of classical economic theory, it can be
argued that since the insider ' presumably has both inside information
and insight superior to that of most outside investors, he should be
better able to forecast prices. With superior forecasting ability, the
insider should be able to recognize market pricing errors and realize a
better return than outsiders. Therefore, the argument goes, his trans-
actions should create market pressure in the direction of the correct
price. The market will flash the proper signals more quickly to man-
agement, evaluation of investment proposals will be more accurate, and
resources will be more properly allocated.6
The insider's profit in such trading can come from any of three
sources. First, he may be better able than outsiders to determine the
5 To avoid confusion over antecedents, the insider will be referred to in the
singular, and investors in the plural.
6 If the market rate of return to which the management tries to gear the rate of
return on capital expenditures is the long-run rate of return, the more rapid price
adjustment allegedly brought about by insider trading will not affect the decisions
made.
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implications of new information and the effect it will have on the com-
pany's future earnings. Second, he may be able to capitalize on in-
formation that could have been made available to the investing public,
but which has not Finally, he may be able to capitalize on information
that could not have been made public in any event.
If the insider's superior insight gave him an edge, a similar edge
should be available to the security analysts who thoroughly familiarize
themselves with the insider's corporation. If that edge were available,
the institutions for which they work would realize better returns than
the market as a whole. We have already seen that there is no evidence
that such returns are realized.- Since, however, even the institutional
analyst may not be quite as familiar as the insider with the industry in
question, and since the analyst may be concerned with a narrower range
of considerations, some advantage from superior insight may accrue to
the insider. We may, nonetheless, question the extent of that advan-
tage.
Inside Inforination That May Be Made Public
The insider's superior information may be either of the type that
could be made available to the investing public but is delayed, or of the
type that could not be made public. If the insider capitalizes on in-
formation that could be made public, he violates the policy of disclosure
that underlies federal securities regulation.8 But there are also sound
economic reasons for prompt disclosure. If the capital markets are to
allocate resources efficiently, the prices of securities must reflect, as
accurately as possible, the prospects of the corporate issuers. If in-
formation bearing on those prospects is withheld, the implications of
that information cannot be reflected in market prices, and the allocative
function of the capital markets is impaired. Barring manipulation or
fraud, the insider cannot generally realize a return superior to that of
the market as a whole until the information is sufficiently widespread to
sustain a higher or lower price levelY Thus the insider can only profit
if his activity is unnecessarily delaying the adjustment of the market
price of the stock to its appropriate level.
Mispricing is a relative concept. If a security becomes underpriced,
the lower price will result in both an increase in the investment of exist-
7 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
8 "[T]he basic premise of the federal securities laws . . . is that the condition
for trading securities should be such that investment decisions can be made after
consideration of all relevant information." Mundheim, The Texas Glif Sulphur Com-
plaint, 1966 J. Bus. LAw 284, 287.
9 If the inside information does not become generally known, there will be no
change in the market price of the securities except for the temporary fluctuations
caused by the insider's market activity. While an occasional insider can profit from
pushing the price up by buying and selling before the price returns to its previous
level, on the average the market impact of his buying and selling must be roughly the
same. His average purchase and selling prices must also be roughly the same. The
price change can be sustained only if the information becomes general. Obviously, the
adjusted price will be achieved more quickly if the information is released earlier.
19691
474 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing holders of the stock and an increase in the number of holders. How-
ever, the shift to that security will be from other securities. The price of
these other securities will fall. Assuming that all investors have the
same expectations regarding securities,"0 prices will not stabilize until
all securities with the same risk are earning the same rate of return."
However, when mispricing occurs, it is relatively quickly eliminated.
If an insider acquires information that leads him to believe that the
stock of his company is underpriced, his attempt to acquire securities
tends to push the price up. As long as other investors do not have the
information, they have no reason to change their opinions of the value
of the stock. But because the price has been pushed up by the insider's
trading, those who have the stock in their portfolios will substitute other
securities of comparable risk for those of the insider's company. Sub-
stitution will reverse the price effect of insider buying and cause a rise
in the prices of the substituted stocks. Even if the insider disposes of
some of his portfolio securities in order to acquire more stock in his own
company, his net investment is likely to increase so that there may be a
general rise in the price of stock, resulting from the infusion of new
funds. The general rise will affect the whole market, not just the stock
of the insider's company, and the impact of the insider trading will be
dissipated considerably. The impact may not even be statistically de-
tectable. More important, while insider trading may have increased the
price of the stock of the insider's company, the price will not be rela-
tively higher than the price of the stock of other companies. As long as
the market does not have the inside information, investors will not find
it worthwhile to include the stock of the insider's company in their
portfolios at the increased price, and they will substitute lower-priced
securities of comparable risk. Stocks of comparable risk must have the
same yield. As we shall see, however, in the longer run insider
trading will cause the stock to be relatively underpriced.
If we assume that investors have different earnings expectations,
the price an investor is willing to pay becomes a function of his opti-
1o This is not inconsistent with the preceding sentences. Diversification require-
ments limit the amount of any single security that a risk-averting investor can include
in his portfolio. A fall in the price of that security will enlarge the amount consistent
with those requirements and will induce other investors to substitute that security for
others of comparable risk.
11 As a first approximation, the rate of return on a share of stock can be defined
as the discount rate the stockholders use to determine the present equivalent of the next
dividend and the liquidation value of the stock in question one year hence. The liquida-
tion value of the share one year hence is equivalent to the present value one year hence
of the dividend to be received in the second year plus the liquidation value of the share
at the end of the second year. Similarly, the expected liquidation values of the shares
at the end of the second year, third year, fourth year and so on, can be decomposed.
Thus the shareholder's expected rate of return can be more precisely defined as the
discount rate that translates the stream of all future dividends into the current value
of the share. In a perfectly adjusted portfolio all securities with a given degree of risk
will have the same rate of return. If the price of any security falls, its rate of return
will rise relative to others of the same degree of risk. Investors can then substitute the
"cheap" security and increase the yield while leaving the risk unchanged. If they can
do so, they will.
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mism: stocks with the same earnings and risk may not command the
same price. Under the assumption of heterogeneous expectations, the
market price of one security relative to another depends largely upon the
array of expectations that exist with respect to each security. If we
assume heterogeneous expectations, insider trading may affect price in-
dependently of the dissemination of information. However, if earnings
and risk do not determine the price, there is no such thing as mispric-
ing, and one cannot say that insider trading "corrects" the price, even
though the increased price resulting from the insider's trading will
eventually be matched by increased earnings. The underlying assump-
tion implies that the capital markets themselves may be malfunctioning
seriously, and it is doubtful that insider trading can contribute to proper
adjustment.
It is far more realistic to assume only partial heterogeniety of ex-
pectations together with aversion to risk. The latter requires portfolios
to be diversified, so that even if an investor believed a security was
underpriced, he would not buy it up until the price was wholly corrected.
The assumption of partial heterogeniety of expectations means that
although there are differences of opinion among investors regarding
stocks with the same earnings and risk, there are large strata of in-
vestors who have the same opinion. The market for a given security is
cleared by a member of the stratum containing those who are indifferent
to the security in question. Not all members of that stratum will invest
in that security and it will be largely a matter of chance which particular
members of the stratum invest in the given stock.
If the stratum is dense, that is, if it contains a large number of
potential investors or a large quantity of investible funds, the price of the
stock will resist change except in response to new information. If an
insider with restricted information temporarily drives up the price of
stock by acquiring more for his portfolio, investors in the stratum in
which the market had hitherto been cleared will find the security rela-
tively unattractive. They will attempt to substitute other securities of
equal risk for the security whose price has increased and whose yield
(rate of return) has thereby fallen. Substitution will bring the yield of
the security in question into line with the yield of comparable risk securi-
ties, and prices will stabilize when all securities with the same risk are
earning the same rate of return.
Once the yields are brought back into line, the stock of the insider's
company will be underpriced in relation to the price of other stocks.
Again, the new level of prices may tend to be higher than the old. But
from the point of view of resource allocation, it is the relationship of
prices, not the absolute level that counts. From this point of view,
insider trading does not correct mispricing. It is the dissemination of
information that does so.
The stratum theory largely redeems the concept of mispricing.
Corrections in relative prices must be made through the marginal
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stratum, that is, the stratum containing investors who will either buy or
sell upon the slightest fluctuation of price. For most analytical purposes
the intramarginal investors can be ignored. Their presence or absence
will be a factor in determining the general level of market prices, but
their impact on relative prices will only be felt occasionally when a
change in the volume of their investment alters the stratum in which the
market is cleared.
There has been no research into the validity of the stratum theory
of market expectations. However, we may indulge in casual empiricism
and observe that most investors do not in fact formulate their expecta-
tions independently. In most cases, opinions are formed on the basis of
information and projections supplied by the major financial advisory
services. 2 Each service has a substantial following, and it is not un-
reasonable to believe that while there may be several strata of expecta-
tions with respect to each stock, many strata are quite dense, and there
is a good chance that the marginal investor will be in such a stratum.
In what follows, the assumed model of market behavior is the one just
described, a market of partial heterogeniety of expectations in which
investors are adverse to risk and will therefore attempt to diversify their
portfolios.
Inside Information That May Not Be M111ade Public
The possibility that the insider's information may be of the type
that could not be made public is not a fictitious one. In the Texa-s Gulf
Sudphur case,"3 for example, the release of news before the company
bought the territory adjacent to its find would have resulted in the loss
of considerable profit potential. In the case of a profitable contract or
technological development, there may be good reason to delay release
until the contract is signed or the development tested. There is, there-
fore, no question about the existence of information whose release may
have to be delayed. 4 But I strongly suspect that on the merits, the case
for secrecy is questionable in many instances. To be sure, if the insider
trades on information that must be delayed, the adjustment of market
price may take place more promptly if the time between the insider's
buying and the release of information is not too long. But if the insider
were allowed to trade on this kind of inside information, there would
12 The major services are supplemented by a host of minor ones. However, the
minor ones depend upon the major services for a great deal of analysis. Thus the
expectations generated by the small services are not necessarily different from those
generated by the large ones. Obviously this whole stratum theory of stock pricing
applies only to widely traded stocks. We must note that even in the case of such
stocks, the stock may be held by a small fraction of the stratum and their reaction
may not wholly offset the action of the insider. We may presume, however, that such
failure would be relatively rare.
Is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 37 U.S.L.W. 2126 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968)
(en banc).
141 refer to the kind of information that enables those privy to it to make a large
profit by purchasing the stock of the corporation, not to the kind of information on
which an insider can capitalize by acting contrary to the interests of the corporation.
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be a temptation to delay information when delay is unwarranted. The
impairment resulting from delay must be offset against the improvement
in market pricing, insofar as an improvement is realized. We have no
evidence about the primary source of insider trading profits, but even
if the profits from capitalizing on undisclosable information are large,
there is no reason to believe that the improvement in market pricing
will exceed the impairment resulting from delay. A similar argument
can be made against permitting an insider to capitalize by trading on
whatever advantage his superior insight may yield.
Inside Trading and the Cost of Funds
Capital budgeting is the process of deciding what investment op-
portunities should be undertaken. Capital budgeting procedures depend
on estimations of future earnings and determination of the discount
rate to be applied to expected income.' 5 The recommended discount
rate is the weighted average cost of the different types of capital funds
used by the corporation,' and the cost of each type is the rate of return
investors expect from it.
A principal characteristic of an equity security is the uncertainty of
the return the investors are going to realize from it. Because of the
high degree of risk that does in fact obtain in the case of equities, in-
vestors expect a high rate of return.' But when insider trading is
profitable, outside investors only partially share in the good fortunes
of the company, while the losses are accentuated. This can be seen by
considering two companies, A and B, which are alike in all respects
except that insiders trade in company A and do not in company B.'"
The stocks of the two companies will be referred to as security A and
security B. Because insiders usurp an undue portion of the earnings
stream of security A, the range of possible outcomes for outside in-
vestors in security A is depressed downward in relation to the range
for holders of security B. Since outside investors ultimately determine
the price of the stock, the rates of return to the outsiders on security A
and security B must eventually be the same. The average rate of return
to the totality of investors in A must be greater than the rate of return
to the totality of investors in B, because the totality of investors in A
includes the inside trader who has a higher rate of return than the out-
siders. Thus the price of security A will fall until the rate of return for
A matches the rate of return for B. In other words, the price of
15 See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 390-92.
16 E. SOLomoN, THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 69-75 (1963).
17 It can be argued that the rate of return investors demand has been excessive in
light of the risks that actually obtain in the equity market. One of the considerable
contributions of the movement of institutional investors into the equity market may
have been to decrease the differential rate of return on equities and other types of
securities.
18 The extreme assumption that there is no insider trading in company B stock is
made only to simplify the discussion. The distortions subsequently described will occur
as long as there is more insider trading in company A.
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security A will be less than it would have been in the absence of insider
trading."9
If this were not so, the rate of return on security A to outside in-
vestors would be less than the rate of return to investors in B. But
then the range of possible outcomes for security A relative to its rate of
return would be greater than the range of possible outcomes for security
B relative to its rate of return.'0 This would make security A less
attractive than security B, and rational investors would shift from
A to B. The process of shifting would depress the price of A and in-
crease the price of B until the returns on the two securities were in line.
At that point the rate of return to the totality of investors in A would
exceed the rate of return to the company. The cost of funds would
therefore be higher for company A than for company B and there would
be underinvestment in company A relative to company B. Even if the
actual range of possible outcomes was not increased, it would be in-
creased relative to the rate of return realized by the outside investors
if the rate of return they realized was not commensurate with that
earned by the company. In the absence of an adjustment in the rate
of return, the security will not be as attractive as it would be without
insider trading.
Empirical Evidence on the Profitability of Insider Trading
There have been three published investigations by economists to
determine whether or not insider trading is in fact profitable.2 ' In addi-
10 One must distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of insider
trading. In the short run the insider's activity may push prices up without having any
lasting effect on the relative prices of the stock in his company and the stock of other
companies. But in the long run his trading has a depressing effect on the price of
his company's stock for the reasons given in the text.
20 Technically speaking, the coefficient of variation is greater for security A than
for security B. The coefficient of variation is a statistic widely recognized as a
measure of risk. I have assumed that the range of possible outcomes for security A
was simply shifted downward and that the width of the range remained unchanged.
But because the range we are concerned with is the range of outcomes the investors
think is possible, it is possible that the lower end of the range will be depressed more
than the upper end. However, for the purpose at hand, there is no need to make the
more tenuous assumption that the range is widened. It should be noted that the effect
discussed here is distinct from the effect discussed in the text accompanying notes
17-19 supra. There, underpricing was attributed to discounting a decreased income
stream at an unchanged capitalization rate. Here the effect on the price of the security
is compounded because the smaller income stream is capitalized at a higher rate.
Against this increase in risk we must offset any stabilizing effects the insider
trading may have. In most cases the information upon which the insider traded will
be released fairly quickly, and the price to which the insider's trading pushed the
stock-insofar as such trading did affect the price-will be sustained by market action.
Where the nature of the information was such that some delay in its release was
mandatory, insider trading may bring the price of the stock in line with the true
prospects of the firm somewhat more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case.
This kind of price action is stabilizing, and such stabilization reduces the riskiness of
the stock. However, it is difficult to believe that this effect would be anywhere near as
significant as the possible mispricing effect.
21F. SmITH, MANAGEMENT TRADING: STOCK MARKET PRICES AND PROFITS
(1941) ; Wu, Corporate Insider Trading Profits and the Ability to Forecast Stock
Prices, in ELEmENTS oF INVE TMENTS 442 (H. Wu & A. Zakon eds. 1965); Lorie &
Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 3. LAW &
ECON. 35 (1968).
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tion there are at least one unpublished dissertation m and two unpub-
lished theses on the question.3 O'Donnell studied the relationship be-
tween the prices of insider's transactions and subsequent changes in the
prices of the stocks of their companies. Wu, Smith and Driscoll exam-
ined insider trading profits. Neither Smith nor Driscoll found sufficient
evidence to indicate that insider profits exceeded outsider profits. In
one of Wu's two experiments, the results were not statistically signifi-
cant, although the insider performance was superior to that of the
market. But Wu's more significant experiment suggests that insider
trading is profitable, and the findings of both O'Donnell and Lorie and
Niederhoffer suggest the same conclusion. The preponderance of the
evidence seems to suggest that insider trading is profitable.
Should There Be Any Insider Trading?
The prohibition of insider trading can be defended on the economic
grounds given above. Any time any portion of the investing public has
its earnings reduced by the action of insiders, the required rate of return
will be increased.2
It is difficult to see the justification even for long-term insider
trading.' There is nothing magical or sacred about six months. If
insider trading in a six month period is harmful, a seven or eight month
turnaround is just as harmful. Whenever the insider profits from the
use of inside information, he does so at the expense of other share-
holders.
The Corporation as an Insider
It might seem that an exception to any prohibition of insider
trading has to be made when the insider is the corporation itself. To be
sure one group of investors benefits at the expense of another group.
The gains of the winners completely match the losses of the losers and
the investors' chances of being among the winners, at first glance, are
not biased downward because any particular group has an inside track.
There is no reason to change expectations.
Unfortunately, this view is deceptive. The insider does have an
inside track. He knows what the corporation is doing. He is not
likely to surrender the stock, and the outside investors' chances of being
2H . Wu, Corporate Insider Trading, Profitability, and Stock Price Movement,
- , 1963 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
2
3T. Driscoll, Some Aspects of Corporate Insiders' Stock Holdings and Trading
under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, - , 1956 (unpublished M.B.A.
thesis, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); T. O'Donnell, The Stock
Market Activity of the Corporate Insider, and Future Price Movements of his Stock,
- , 1960 (unpublished M.B.A. thesis, Wharton School, University of Pennsyl-
vania).
24 In order to realize a rate of return commensurate with the risks, the outsiders
will have to get the stock at a lower price so that the average rate of return to all
stockholders may rise.
2-The objections raised here are to trading, not owning. Indeed, even trading on
account of an insider would not be objectionable if the investment decisions were ade-
quately insulated from the insider's discretion.
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among the winners are not the same as the insider's. It is also to be
noted that by simply sitting tight the insider increases his control over
the company. How important that point is depends upon a number of
factors, including how much stock the present management has, how
much the corporation repurchases, and how entrenched the present man-
agement is.
Corporate repurchases of shares to effect an acquisition are objec-
tionable on other grounds as well. The corporation takes advantage
either of its own selling stockholder or of the stockholders of the selling
firm. The insider corporation either buys the stock quietly and fails to
supply the seller with some relevant information or publicly announces
its intention to buy, in which case the price of the stock is driven up, to
the disadvantage of the stockholders of the acquired firm, who are
usually paid in stock of the acquiring corporation according to a schedule
based on market value. In the former situation, the corporation's
actions favor the corporate insider. In the latter, there is a very real
possibility of price distortion. The only justification for such corporate
repurchases is that the company is saved some of the expenses associated
with new issues. The net saving cannot be significant. The potential
harm is substantial.
If the object of corporate repurchases is to utilize spare cash, the
corporation is in effect evading taxes for its stockholders by undue
retention. The after-tax rate of return to the stockholders is artificially
biased upward,2" thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital and expand-
ing the range of projects acceptable to management. The management
now finds itself in the position of accepting investment proposals that
could not survive a less biased test of profitability.
Insider Trading as Compensation and the Pricing System
The economic case against insider trading is not confined to its
impact on the cost of funds. Professor Manne argues that in very
special circumstances, to be discussed later, insider trading plays the
crucial role of furnishing special compensation to employees who pro-
vide dynamic thrust in our industrial society, and who are identified as
entrepreneurs.' It is his premise that entrepreneurs will be attracted
by the profit potential of insider trading. But if the entrepreneur is
compensated by being allowed to trade as an insider, a monkey wrench
is thrown into the pricing mechanism. The social cost of using the
entrepreneur and the corporation's cost diverge. Unless the divergence
26 So-called growth firms also take advantage of this aspect of the tax structure
by design or otherwise. Their opportunities to invest are so great that they are
niggardly with dividends and plow the bulk of their earnings into new investments.
Without approving of the tax structure, we may note that the depressing effect on the
cost of funds is not as harmful in this situation as in the case of repurchasing shares.
As long as the growth company expands rapidly enough to live up to its label, it is
hardly likely to be overinvesting. To the contrary, the high rate of return earned by
growth companies suggests that they underinvest
27 Entrepreneurs are not to be confused with suppliers of capital.
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is uniform throughout the economy, the pricing system's effectiveness
as an allocative mechanism is impaired. That might be a small price to
pay in order to have a dynamic society, but Professor Manne has not
established that it is indeed the price we have to pay.
The disruption of the pricing mechanism is compounded by the
inefficiency of insider trading as a method of compensating the entre-
preneur. For one thing, insider trading cannot be confined to entre-
preneurs. It is hard to believe that to create an incentive we must
scatter rewards broadside in the direction of the entrepreneur, hoping
that he will catch some and tolerating the unfortunate consequences for
allocative efficiency.
II. HARM TO THE OUTSIDER '
In defense of the proposition that the outsider is not harmed by
insider trading, Professor Manne argues that (1) the selling share-
holders do not lose what the insider gains, (2) even if the selling share-
holders do lose, outsiders as a group do not necessarily lose, and (3)
investors (defined as long-term holders) lose proportionately less the
longer they hold their shares.
Creation vs. Capture of Value
Professor Manne's argument that the outsiders do not lose what
the insider gains is relatively simple. According to him, buying shares
on insider information is the equivalent of selling information directly.
As the insider buys, the price of the shares rises. When the price rises
to a level commensurate with the information he has, the insider has
exchanged the value of the information for the appreciation in the value
of his shares. But the exchange by the insider is not a sale. In a sale
the* recipients of benefits surrender something in exchange. In this
case, the stockholders who still hold their shares participate in the in-
crement in value without surrendering anything, because new value has
been created. The insider gains part of the new value that has been
created, and his gain is not made at the expense of anyone.29
The weakness of this argument is that it attributes the creation of
value to the insider's use of the information at his disposal.1 Whether
281 must candidly admit bias. Although I refrain from moral judgments in the
body of the text, I cannot help but observe that the number of practices that I consider
uniavory and that Professor Manne is willing not only to condone but actually to
defend has probably affected my willingness to accept some of his speculations.
2 9 
MANNE 61. Professor Manne recognized that the insider may profit from bad
news as well as good. In connection with the argument described in the text, Manne
notes that "it is simply a matter of convenience to use only one illustration instead of
two." Id. at 244 n.4. This is nonsense. An analogous argument is that the insider
has profited because he destroyed value. If one translates Professor Marine's discussion
into one dealing with insider trading on bad news, the passage becomes an exceedingly
odd one.
30 This is not to say that information is not valuable, but much of the value of
information to the insider stems from the artificial scarcity that results from not making
it public.
19691
482 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the market recognizes it or not, the stock has increased in potential
value when the productivity of the firm increases in fact or prospectively.
Insider purchasing is an attempt to capture unrecognized value, not a
creation of value. The price of the stock would respond to purchases
by the insider whether he had information or not. If he were buying
because of an erratic whim, the price would fall back to its original level
shortly after the purchases by the insider ceased. There is nothing in
the transaction itself to sustain a new price level. The new level can
be maintained only if the purchasing is accompanled by release of the
new information. Moreover, the price rise would come about with
the dispersal of the new information even if the insider did not buy
a single share.
Since the information by itself would have caused an increase in
the price of the stock, the shareholders who sold their stock to the in-
siders would have shared the benefits from the price increase with the
continuing holders if the insider had not been buying. It makes no
difference that some shareholders might have sold the stock anyway.3
The question is how gains are divided between the insider and outsiders.
To the extent that investors sell their stock to buyers other than the
insider, the gains will accrue to outsiders rather than the insider.
The weakness in Professor Manne's case is that he measures the
damage to outsiders by how much more the selling stockholders would
have had if the information were not made public at all. But surely
the appropriate measure is how much more the sellers would have had
if the information had been made public from the beginning."
We must postpone evaluation of Professor Manne's contention that
outsiders as a group do not lose even if shareholders who sell to the
insider do until we have examined his view of how the stock market
operates. As will be shown in part III, the stock market is not quite
as he sees it, and his conclusions regarding outsider losses do not hold.
The delay will not be long because Professor Manne's argument about
the triviality of investor losses can be disposed of quickly.
The Fate of Investors
In dealing with the problem of investor losses, Professor Manne
has in effect defined an investor as a long-term holder. It is extremely
hard to draw a sharp dividing line between the investor and the specu-
lator, and the usefulness of the distinction is doubtful. It implies that
moving in and out of a security is speculation. But even an investor
must constantly check the relationship between the price and income
of a security, and deem a security worth holding only as long as the
31 It is doubtful that they would have sold at the lower price if the information had
been available. Certainly some would have held out.
32The only instance in which the kind of comparison Manne makes has any
legitimacy is the case in which the insider is trading on superior insight, which by its
very nature cannot be transmitted to the public.
[Vol.ll7
BOOK REVIEWS
price is within a given range. The range may change, but since the
price can move out of the range at any time, even an investor may find
himself holding some securities for only a short period of time.
Thus not only the short-term traders, who Professor Manne seems
to think should receive no sympathy, but also conscientious investors
may very well unload securities if the price rises above the critical level
without their receiving any news that would warrant reconsidering the
value of the security. It makes absolutely no difference how long in-
vestors have held their stock. If they lose money as a consequence of
insider trading, they have suffered. It is irrelevant to argue, as Pro-
fessor Manne does, that the amount lost as a result of insider trading
may be small in comparison with the amount gained over the long run,
unless there is sufficient justification for any losses being incurred.
III. PROFESSOR MANNE'S VIEW OF THE STOCK MARKET
The stock market that Professor Manne describes is a strange and
unfamiliar place. It consists essentially of four sets of investors. Some
know what stocks are worth, are unlikely to be hurt, and can therefore
be ignored. Other investors know nothing and will buy or sell in re-
action to random events such as the death of a President. Manne cor-
rectly anticipates that their purchases and sales will be random. The
third and fourth groups are chartists, who are also essentially "know-
nothings." Members of the third group will buy or sell according to
their interpretation of changes in prices. The fourth group consists of
those who react to the rate of change in prices.
The Neglected Traders
These are the players on the stage that Manne builds. The "know-
it-alls" naturally have a perfectly elastic demand for a given stock.
They will quickly purchase any stock for sale at a price lower than what
they know the stock to be worth, and they will dump their stock if the
price rises above that level. They cannot be influenced or hurt by
insider trading. If all the other traders in the market were indeed
"know-nothings," Manne's point about the net damage to ousiders
would have more validity. But Manne specifically excludes the vast
body of traders who know more than nothing but less than everything.
Indeed, Manne himself notes that "the truth for most traders lies
between these two extremes." ' Institutional investors, for example,
are implicitly excluded from Manne's view of the market.
Such "know-something" investors do not know exactly what stocks
are worth but do try to estimate their value. Some may consider a
stock worth more than its existing market price but will limit their
investment in that stock in the interest of diversification. For the same
reason many investors will curtail their holdings of securities they do
2 3MANNE 94.
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not consider overpriced. The two tendencies just mentioned will make
the demand curve for equities slope downward. As the price of a given
security falls (functionally), existing holders are willing to expand
their position in this stock to a limited extent even though their diversi-
fication may diminish as a result. Other investors on the margin who
had previously excluded the stock from their portfolios may be brought
into the market. If an insider starts buying there will be corresponding
liquidations that would not have otherwise taken place.
Do "Know-Nothings" Lose Nothing?
The net loss from insider trading will certainly not be zero when
there exists an intermediate group. However, even if the "know-it-
alls" and the "know-nothings" were the only traders in the market, the
net loss would not be zero.
Manne's argument that the net loss to the "know-nothings" from
insider trading is likely to be zero is based upon the Random Walk
theory of the stock market8 4 That theory suggests that inferences
drawn about future price changes from the history of price changes will
not enable one to profit on trading. The gross profits made by using
past prices as a guide for trading will probably not significantly exceed
the cost of transactions.
3 5
Manne's case hinges upon the proposition that insider trading
changes the pattern of sales. As a result of insider trading, some of the
"know-nothings" who would otherwise have sold will not sell and will
be better off. Some "know-nothings" who would have bought but do not
buy because of insider trading are worse off. Finally, the market be-
havior of some "know-nothings" will not be affected by insider trading.
In dealing with the third group of investors, the "know-nothings"
who buy or sell according to their interpretation of price changes,
Manne again seems to compare the gains or losses resulting from insider
trading with the gains and losses resulting from withholding the news
without insider trading. This is not a wholly legitimate comparison.
Except in those relatively rare instances where the welfare of the cor-
poration would have been jeopardized by disclosure, the release of the
information must have the same effect as insider buying or there is not
much point in insider buying. Thus it is not accurate to say that
"without insider trading one cannot assume that the price would have
progressed . . . ," "
This conceptual error also permeates his argument that the gains
and losses for the outsiders who sell to the insider tend to cancel out.
3
4 See THE RANDOm CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKEz PRICES (P. Cootner ed. 1964).
35This is quite different from saying that future prices cannot be predicted. The
value of a stock is determined by the underlying health of the issuing firm and by its
prospects. One can make reasonable predictions about the future prices of stocks
without being able to specify the time path of the price of the stock. It is logically
possible to make such predictions over an extended period of time without being able
to infer the sequence of price changes.
36 MANNE 101.
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Professor Manne claims that some outsiders sold at higher prices than
they otherwise would have, and others, influenced by price changes, sold
where they otherwise would not have sold. He correctly attributes a
loss of potential profit to the second group, but he mistakenly assumes
that in the absence of insider trading, the first group would not have
had a higher price at which to sell.
There is one situation in which the stock sold to an insider might
have been sold in any case. The broker receiving an order from an
insider may well turn to institutional order departments to see if they
are in the market to sell the stock in question. Order departments do
not make the basic decisions of what to buy or sell. These decisions are
made by investment committees or other management personnel. The
order department merely executes the decisions, and if it sells the stock
bought by an insider it is selling stock that would have been sold any-
way. Here again, however, the insider is not buying from a "know-
nothing." Presumably the decision to sell was carefully formulated on
basis of the best information available. If the decision-makers had had
the information that the insider has, the decision to sell might not have
been made.
IV. DAMAGE UNDER THE RANDOM WALK THEORY
The available evidence does not make it possible to dismiss the
Random Walk theory lightly. It does not follow, however, that security
evaluation has to be abandoned. One must still determine whether the
rate of return is commensurate with the risk. The theory itself is
premised on the proposition that all information is promptly analyzed
and reflected in the price of the stock.
I have postulated a significant number of investors on the margin
of indifference at the prevailing price. Some will already hold stock,
some will not. It is a matter of chance how many will instruct their
brokers to sell at a given price. The amount by which the specialists
or traders will raise or lower the price depends upon the extent of the
imbalance. This in itself is sufficient to create a substantial random
element in price changes. It in no way interferes with the fundamental
pricing process.3 7
Every time the price changes, the composition of those on the
margin of indifference changes. However, while it is a matter of chance
whether a particular holder of stock sells at a particular price, if the
price rises, some formerly indifferent investors will sell their stock. Of
course, insider trading will tend to raise the price. But some investors
3 ' This is not the theoretical foundation of the Random Walk theory. The pro-
ponents, of the Random Walk theory assume that the market accurately evaluates
stock, and that new information is quickly reflected in prices, so that it is practically
impossible to ride even short term trends. Price changes are thus random because
news comes to the market in a random fashion. If the market responded to insider
trading as slowly as Manne implies it does, and if insider trading were prevalent, the
Random Walk theory would not hold.
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who sell their stock in response to the price movements induced by
insider buying would not have sold their stock if the insider information
had been made public. The indifferent sellers are indifferent only in
light of the prevailing information. If they had had access to the inside
information, they would not have been indifferent.
Investors do not behave quite as irrationally as Professor Manne
suggests. By and large, securities are reasonably well evaluated.
Although stories of stock market killings are common, no one has ever
produced evidence that any particular subset of investors has been able
to realize consistently better rates of return than could have been earned
on randomly selected stocks. It seems that the market recognizes mis-
priced securities quite rapidly and promptly corrects pricing errors.
This is perfectly compatible with random price changes. It means that
information reaching the market is translated into appropriate price
adjustments. It is not the insider's trading alone that brings about
price changes.
V. INSIDER TRADING AS COMPENSATION FOR THE ENTREPRENEUR
Professor Manne's case for insider trading does not rest solely
upon the proposition that it is not harmful. He maintains that it is
positively beneficial because it provides an incentive to the entrepreneur.
The Entrepreneur
Professor Manne's view of the dynamics of capitalism is largely
that of the great economist Joseph Schumpeter 3 8 Schumpeter thought
that the thrust of modern capitalism was provided by the entrepreneur,
who in Schumpeter's lexicon was an innovator, not simply the pro-
prietor of a business. The entrepreneur's genius lay in his ability to
recognize the economic advantages of combining the factors of produc-
tion in new and different ways. Innovation could involve introducing
a new invention into the productive process, utilizing existing equipment
in more efficient ways, developing products, introducing new marketing
techniques, or reorganizing jobs within a firm. The economic advan-
tages of innovation lay in being the first on the market with a new
product, the first on the market with a significant modification of a
product or the first with significant reductions in costs. Schumpeter
theorized that once an innovation had proved itself, an increasing
number of imitators would copy the innovation, closing the gap between
prices and costs through competition, until the innovation yielded no
more than any other business activity.
Schumpeter labeled the extraordinary but temporary return from
innovation "profit." It was income that accrued to the entrepreneur,
not necessarily to the capitalist. Schumpeter believed that the entre-
preneur received a higher income than he actually required as an in-
38See J. ScHumPEER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1949); 3.
SCHumPErER, CAPITALIsM, SocrAusM AND) DEMOCRACY (1950).
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centive for supplying society with innovations. He also believed that
with the growth of large modern corporations, the entrepreneurial
function would be routinized, the entrepreneurial psychology would
fade, and the dynamic force of capitalism would end. On these last two
points, Professor Manne parts company with Schumpeter.
There is little doubt that Schumpeter misread the future of large
corporations. His celebrated colleague, John Kenneth Galbraith, has
now advanced the theory that without large corporations our modern
economic system would have lost its thrust. 9 In the postwar period we
have witnessed a fantastic technological and organizational revolution.
The impetus for this revolution has come from the technologically
oriented management of large corporations that had both the resources
and the motivation to develop large and expensive innovations.
In the development of the large corporation, Galbraith sees a de-
cline in the influence of the owners of capital and a convergence of the
structures of all highly industrialized economic systems. Unlike
Schumpeter, Galbraith foresees the demise of capitalism as a process of
creative growth, not of decay.
Where our system goes from here is not of particular concern to
Professor Manne or the problem at hand. But Professor Manne does
feel that there is room for the innovator in modern giant corporations;
that the innovator has not traditionally been overpaid; and that if he is
not adequately compensated in the future, capitalism will indeed lose its
dynamic thrust.
The Entrepreneur's Compensation
The innovator is part of the corporate organization, and, like all
members of the organization, he receives a salary. To Manne this
salary is an inadequate incentive to induce the potential innovator to
stick his neck out. An essential feature of innovation is that it has
never been tried before. The innovator faces the substantial uncertainty
of whether the development he proposes will prove profitable or turn
out to be a bust.
Manne maintains that neither bonuses nor stock options are ade-
quate salary supplements. He finds the bonus inadequate for a number
of reasons, including that it may prove embarrassing to disclose a
substantial bonus. Furthermore, Manne argues that because the
amount of the bonus is decided entirely by someone other than the
recipient, the bonus may not take account of all the beneficial effects of
innovation. The amount of a bonus depends upon the welfare of the
entire company, and even a very profitable innovation may fail to bring
a company out of rough waters.
The difficulty with options is that if they are granted before dis-
closure of the innovation, but after management knows about it, man-
agement again determines the reward the innovator is to be given before
39J. GA.BRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
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the real value of the innovation is known. If the option is granted
prior to the innovation as an incentive, there is no way of knowing
whether it is commensurate with the prospective innovation or not.
To Manne, the only solution is to permit the innovator to trade on his
inside knowledge. The innovator is then able to compensate himself
with a reward that he considers commensurate with the worth of his
innovation.
Professor Manne is not unaware that there are some objections to
the use of inside information as compensation. Among the possible
drawbacks he notes and dismisses are fraudulent manipulation, inten-
tional creation of bad news, delay in disclosures, stock pools, profiting
from bad news, and profiting by the wrong persons. The quality of his
treatment of the various objections is uneven, but all his arguments are
premised on the underlying assumption that there is a need for entre-
preneurial compensation that cannot be supplied in any other way.
Professor Manne correctly points out that salary and promotion
are available to other members of the corporate organization besides
entrepreneurs. It does not follow, however, that salary increases and
promotion cannot be considered adequate compensation for innovation.
Salary increments and promotions are granted for a wide variety of
services rendered to the corporation, and there is no reason why entre-
preneurial activity cannot be one of them. More important, in our
society the advantages of moving up in the corporate hierarchy are not
confined to increased income. The status, the prerogatives, and the
power that go with promotions are also highly valued. Even the
physical appointments of an office have acquired an extraordinary
importance in our society. If innovation is one method of achieving
the increased pay and other appurtenances of promotions, it is ridiculous
to argue that the potential entrepreneur will cease to innovate for lack
of incentive.
It is likely that a great many innovations have been made by people
who never dreamed of making a fortune on the stock market as a result.
The market in which the scientist can translate scientific advances into
substantial stock market gains is a fairly recent product of the growth
orientation of the stock market.
The typical killing from the use of inside information regarding
innovations is usually made in small and moderate-sized firms. The
major technological innovations of our age have usually been made by
the industrial giants, and the possibility of profiting from inside in-
formation in an industrial giant is relatively small. The typical innova-
tion affects only a small segment of the company, and has a minor effect
upon the earnings per share. If we depended upon insider trading to
motivate innovators, most innovations would probably never have
been made.
Professor Manne is so concerned with distinguishing between
profit and other forms of income that he loses sight of an important
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economic truth. He notes, "Only the value of the innovation at the
moment of creation reflects profit, and the return to the entrepreneur.
Subsequent income . . . is never profit in this sense." 1o He neglects
the present value concept of the flow of money. The total increment to
the innovator's income stream that may result from being rewarded
with salary increases and advances within the corporate hierarchy may
also have a very substantial present value.
It is wholly unrealistic to assume that if insider trading were com-
pletely prohibited, the corporate world would find no way to compen-
sate the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur's contribution to the corpora-
tion is truly valuable and the corporation is shortsighted enough to
fail to recognize and reward the innovation, there will be a competitor
interested in attracting the entrepreneur.
Professor Manne's case for the use of inside information as entre-
preneurial compensation is unconvincing. We may therefore look at
his dismissal of the objections to using information as compensation
without allowing him the premise that the need for entrepreneurial
compensation cannot be supplied in any other way.
We must grant that delays in disclosure may sometimes be neces-
sary to the well-being of the corporation. But the elimination of insider
trading would minimize the inducement to delay disclosure, whereas
the authorization of insider trading would maximize the inducement to
delay disclosures. The only party to gain from such delay would be the
insider.
Manne dismisses the objection that permitting insider trading
might lead to the formation of manipulative stock pools with the in-
credible argument that "the pool, that alleged arch villain of the pre-
1933 stock market, was an efficient device for exploiting information." 41
This has an element of truth. The men that ran the pools were out to
make money. But since they were willing to take advantages of lies,
their perversity would have been phenomenal if they had failed to take
advantage of the truth when an advantage was to be taken. The pools
are hardly redeemed thereby.
Oddly enough, in defending the profiting by entrepreneurs from
bad news, Manne substantially undermines his own entrepreneurial case.
Manne clearly recognizes and accepts that if insider trading is allowed,
the entrepreneur may benefit not only from knowledge of his innova-
tions, but also from any other valuable information that may come his
way. Professor Manne argues:
Competition for entrepreneurs does not take the usual
form of offering a specific amount of money. Rather,
entrepreneurs will be attracted to those positions offering the
greatest opportunity for them to make large, indefinite gains.
4o MANN E 120.
41 id. at 153.
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. . . Because the cost to the corporation for this form of
compensation is so low, competition among corporations for
entrepreneurs would quickly force all of them to allow their
insider entrepreneurs to trade in bad news as well as good.4'
In answer to this argument we should note first that there is no
reason to believe the "positions offering the greatest opportunity .
to make large, indefinite gains" are positions in companies for which
entrepreneurs can effectively introduce innovations. Second, the prin-
cipal force that will induce corporations to offer this kind of emolument
is that other corporations do so. When viewed in this way, the rewards
to entrepreneurs seem to be a form of rent. Society will not suffer
without such inducements. Finally, once insider trading is permitted,
there is no way of confining the rewards to the entrepreneur when
innovation is institutionalized as it is in a large corporation. The
information will inevitably be known by many people. It is a feeble
answer to argue that it is "extremely difficult to identify individuals
performing the entrepreneurial functions or to know the precise moment
at which an individual performs an entrepreneurial act." " It is even
more feeble to argue that "the contribution of an individual may be so
subtle . . . and yet so critical that we must be very cautious in con-
cluding that no reward is deserved." ' The plain fact of the matter is
that not everybody who may gain from insider trading has participated
in the innovation. And there is no real chance that the respective re-
wards to the various persons engaging in insider trading will be com-
mensurate with their contributions to the innovation.
VI. THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION
The objections to insider trading would be of little avail unless
such trading could be effectively prohibited. Manne denies that it can,
maintaining that if insiders cannot trade on their own information they
will trade on that of others. According to him, information can be
exchanged with other insiders so that the community of insiders can
trade in securities on the basis of information other than their own.
Of course, this can only be done if there exists an effective mechanism
for trading information. Manne maintains that a market for informa-
tion exists, but his case is not convincing."5
The market for information, as Manne conceives it, consists of two
basic parts: the social circles in which company executives move, and
the investment banking community.
According to Manne, while an executive may not be able to benefit
from the knowledge that his company has made significant advances in
improving its product, there is nothing to prevent him from passing
4 2 1d. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
4 3 Id. at 156.
4 4 Id. at 157.
451 do not mean to imply that I think all insider trading could be effectively
prevented at little expense.
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this information on to an executive of a different corporation at the
nineteenth hole. It would be naive to maintain that such informing is
never done, but it is hard to believe that there is any significant sys-
tematic exchange of information in this fashion. An executive is much
more likely to inform a close personal friend than his counterpart in
another corporation. Industrial espionage is a serious problem, and
corporate officers are extremely circumspect in passing along informa-
tion about their corporation.
In addition, it is extremely difficult to establish a quid pro quo in
this type of exchange. There is no reasonable guarantee that the re-
cipient will ever have information of comparable value or that he will
pass it along to the informer. It is hard to see why a corporate officer
would take a risk with such a small possibility of receiving adequate
return. Really worthwhile information must be relatively rare, and it
seems that golf course trading in information would involve more
hazard than it would be worth.
The second component of Manne's alleged information market is
the investment banking community."" Investment bankers are looked
upon as clearing houses of information, which presumably comes both
from the various directorships that members of investment banking
houses hold and from their frequent contacts with company executives.
There exists a cleavage in the investment banking community with
respect to directorships. Some investment banking houses, and some
major ones at that, are quite reluctant to accept directorships 7 Other
investment banking houses actively seek directorships. If the informa-
tion clearance function is as significant as Manne maintains it is, the
investment banking houses that tend to refuse directorships would pre-
sumably find themselves at a significant disadvantage in attracting
business, and it is unlikely that they would take the stand that they do.
It can reasonably be argued that investment bankers accept di-
rectorships because they think that there is money to be made by such
participation and to see to it that the companies in which they have
advised their customers to invest are properly run. There can be
little doubt that many investment bankers also take on directorships
as a means of acquiring intimate knowledge of the firms and industries,
as a means of establishing contacts with other companies whose directors
sit on the same board, and as a means of determining the availability of
merger opportunities.
Investment bankers probably do pass on some information. They
may give important customers significant investment advice, occasion-
ally, though not consistently based on a quid pro quo exchange of in-
formation. In spite of the persistence of corporations in dealing with
the same investment bankers, rivalry among banking institutions is
461 am a little surprised that the investment banking community has not been up
in arms at being portrayed in this particular role.
47SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRiTiEs MARxErs, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I at 432 (1963).
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nevertheless substantial, and good investment suggestions may tend to
keep corporate officers content with existing investment banker relation-
ships. But supplying this kind of investment advice, even if it is done,
is quite different from the clearing house function that Manne envisions.
Another difficulty with viewing the investment banking community
as an information clearing mechanism is that the typical investment
banker deals with only a small number of the corporate employees who
have significant inside information. There are too many company
officers and corporate directors who would be left outside the privileged
circle who could deal in the inside information of others. This kind of a
market does not provide the entrepreneurial compensation that Manne
alleges to be the major justification for insider trading except to the very
top management.
I have serious doubts about how effective the investment banking
community could be as a clearing house for insider information. Much
significant information must be capitalized upon quite quickly if at all.
There is usually no justification for withholding the information from
investors for any extended period of time. It is one thing to imagine
investment bankers dropping hints to clients at social functions, or even,
on occasion, systematically alerting a "preferred" list to a new develop-
ment. It is quite another and more serious matter to visualize invest-
ment bankers making a practice of treating information in this way.
The only evidence that Manne presents to support the existence of this
kind of activity is from the Pecora hearings, dealing with practices
before the prohibition on insider trading.4"
VII. CONCLUSION
Manne's defense of insider trading must be dismissed. My own
attack on insider trading is nevertheless sufficiently speculative to war-
rant caution in advocating extension of insider trading prohibitions.
We seem to be reasonably comfortable with the price we pay for the
existing degree of tolerance toward insider trading. But there is no
doubt in my mind that the economic objections to insider trading,
reinforced by considerations of fairness, require stricter restraints.
4 9
4sThis review was prepared long before the SEC accused Merrill, Lynch of
alerting selected customers to a forthcoming decline in earnings of a company before
the information had been released to the public. It may be that such informing was
more common than I believed when I originally wrote the paper. One may surmise,
however, that the practice was a short-lived one. The recipients of the favored treat-
ment seem to be institutional buyers, so the practice is probably relatively recent in
origin, and the SEC charge against Merrill, Lynch presumably brought about a severe
attrition of the practice. Whether or not the practice will be resumed will of course
depend upon the outcome of this case. It must be noted, however, that the list of
alleged recipients of the news in the pending case did not include possible sources of
inside information. Thus the quid pro quo could not have been information, and even
this development is not evidence of a market in information.
4 9 There is some cause for reservations about hasty recommendations. A pro-
hibition on long-term insider trading is tantamount to a severe curtailment of manage-
ments' investment in the stock of their companies. Such a prohibition would sever one
of the few threads that link capital expenditures to the capital markets, and might
weaken an already frail discipline.
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PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. SECOND
EDITION. By EDWARD Ross ARANOW AND HERBERT A. EINHORN.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. xviii, 692.
$35.00.
Abraham L. Pomerantz
The proxy fight has many attributes of military warfare. The
corporate citadel to be assaulted must first be reconnoitered to ascertain
its pregnability. The strength of incumbent management must be
determined. How many shares can management mobilize, that is, how
many does it own or-that highly fluid conception--control? What
is the likely voting attitude of uncommitted shareholders? If the
corporation is faring badly, it can be assumed that the insurgent group
will do well, for in corporate life, as in politics, when things are going
badly, one sometimes votes in favor of the challenger as a way of
voting against the incumbent.
If it is determined that existing management is vulnerable, the
attacking group girds for battle. It lines up a general staff, usually
consisting of a public relations team, a professional proxy soliciting
organization, security analysts, and one or more lawyers, at least one
of whom must be expert in SEC rules, regulations, and attitudes. The
general staff determines the strategy and tactics of the campaign, in-
cluding especially the content and timing of the propaganda barrage to
be laid down against the incumbents. The infantry consists of proxy
solicitors who, by phone and by foot, accost the shareholders for
their votes.
Then there are the sinews of war. Costs vary from about $40,000
to $1,000,000 and more. Proxy contests are not for the poor or the
faint of heart. Nor, it may be added, are they for the practitioner who
prefers a placid existence. The outcome of many a proxy contest has
been determined by the resourcefulness of the lawyers for the contend-
ing factions, and by their ability to maneuver within the rules of the
game. There are abundant opportunities for the ingenious, and as
many pitfalls for the unwary.
Perhaps the most interesting, valuable, and entertaining aspect
of the second edition of Proxy Contests for Corporate Control' is a
discussion of the strategy and tactics of the proxy combatants. An
extended description of the many devilishly clever schemes dreamed up
t LL.B. 1925, Brooklyn Law School, St. Lawrence University. Member, New
York Bar.
I E. ABANOW & H. EiNHORN, PaoxY CONTESTS FOR COIRoRArE CONTROL (2d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as PROXY CoNTEsTs].
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by the proxy specialists would be prohibitively long, but a few items
discussed by the authors may be noted to suggest the flavor.
Management may undertake various preventive measures to dis-
courage proxy contests. One of the most effective inhibiting devices
is classification of directors. Classification consists of arranging
directors' terms of office so that the terms of various groupings expire
at different times. For example, if the board has nine members and
is divided into three classes, three directors will come up for election
in 1969, three in 1970, and three in 1971. The insurgents now have
a long hill to climb. To gain the prize of majority control, they must
win not just one contest but two, over a period of two years-a very
expensive and time-consuming prospect calculated to dampen the ardor
of even the most passionate suitors. Another effective device to dis-
courage insurgents is the repeal of cumulative voting provisions directly
before the counting of votes when management feels it has won the
election and wants to prevent even token dissident representation on
the board.
If one of the contesting sides, usually management, does not
want the other side even to present its position to the voters, it is
sometimes possible to tie up and monopolize the outstanding proxy
soliciting concerns, thereby denying the insurgents all practical means
of going after the stockholders' votes. This is roughly equivalent to
cutting off the oxygen supply lines of a deep sea diver. In the Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer contest, in which I was retained by the insurgents, we
were the victims of this tactic when the incumbent management, sensing
trouble, tied up all the top soliciting organizations.
As the day of the stockholders' meeting approaches, desperation
breeds invention. At some point before the vote is to be counted, the
embattled groups generally have a pretty good idea of who's ahead.
Often, in a close election, a week's adjournment of the meeting to
pursue additional proxies, or to secure revocation of the opponents'
proxies, can be decisive. One device used to compel adjournment is to
artifically create the absence of a quorum. The simplest method is to
stay away from the meeting altogether. But there are many more
subtle ways in which the absence of a quorum has been procured to
gain time. These methods and the reaction of courts to them are
described in a highly readable and instructive part of Proxy Contests.2
In any proxy contest, perhaps the most important service a lawyer
can render is to get the corporation to pick up the tab of his client's
group, be it incumbent or insurgent. It would seem only fair that
each side should pay its own expenses. But the courts have unwittingly
opened an avenue by which the skillful lawyer can impose his client's
expenses on the corporation. Several courts have held that if a proxy
contest involves corporate "policy," then the contestants may cause the
2
PROXY CoNTEsTs 317-30.
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corporation to pay the bill, but that if the contest involves only "per-
sonalities," then each side must stand its own costs.3
The subtle distinction between "policy" and "personality" sounds
good in print. But just try to apply it. For example, in Selama-
Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham,4 it was held that management
could spend corporate funds "to investigate the character of minority
directors who had been accumulating corporate stock and were prepar-
ing a proxy fight for control at the next annual meeting." ' The
investigation, the lawyer testified, was "in good faith." (How we
lawyers love to characterize our motives-never uncharitably.) The
court found this a "policy" situation because "the directors of a cor-
poration have a duty to investigate any corporation or person whom
they, in good faith, believe to be attempting to gain control of the
corporation .... ,
As so often happens when the courts enunciate fluid and amor-
phous standards, advocacy is given lots of elbow room in the policy-
personality dichotomy. The astute lawyer lays a foundation for the
corporation's assumption of his client's expenses by making sure that
some sort of "policy" issues are referred to in the proxy literature.
In reflecting my own interest in the Machiavellian ploys and
devices that are sometimes used in proxy fights, I do not want to
give the unfair impression that Proxy Contests is just a bag of tricks.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The book is in fact a
comprehensive and lucid treatment of the technical and practical aspects
of proxy fights. The authors are no mere hornbook practitioners, but
are themselves scarred veterans of many proxy battles.
Like its predecessor, this second edition is an extraordinarily useful
manual for both the proxy lawyer and the lay combatants. It sets
forth, in extenso, all the important laws and rules relevant to proxy
contests. It presents a comprehensive condensation of case law and
sets forth quotations from authorities to illuminate the text. The
book contains a large variety of forms that are especially useful when
time is of the essence-and when is it not in a proxy contest? A
well-constructed index makes the book's information easily accessible.
Of special value to the proxy practitioner is a discussion of the
sensitive role played by the SEC in these contests. All statements
made, mailed, or published by the contestants in the propaganda battle
must be "processed" by the SEC. (It is a mortal sin to refer to any-
thing as being approved by the SEC.) Proxy Contests offers valuable
3 PROXY CONTESTS 549 and cases cited id. n.11.
4216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff'd per curiamn, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1964), cited int PROXY CONTESTS 550 n.17.
5 PROXY CONTESTS 550.
6 Selarna-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 114 (S.D. Ohio
1963), aff'd per curiam, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964), quoted in PROXY CONTESTS 551.
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suggestions about what will go, and what will not go, through the
SEC sieve.
The SEC processor's lot is not a happy one. His is the endlessly
dreary and difficult task of trying to draw lines between legitimate
enthusiasm and illicit exaggeration. His is the thankless job of
tearing the heart out of the deathless prose of the proxy statement by
deleting what he conceives to be untrue, unsupported, or unfair state-
ments. ("What is truth?" asked jesting Pilate, but would not wait
for an answer.) Then, having wielded his scalpel, the SEC processor
must defend his surgery in endless debate against his bleeding victim.
To the everlasting credit of the SEC, the greatest of governmental
agencies, it is doing its difficult job with extraordinary skill and un-
questioned impartiality.
A recently popular form of contest for control, while not tech-
nically a proxy contest, is discussed in the chapter on the takeover bid
or tender offer.7 A tender offer occurs when an aspirant to control
extends an invitation to the stockholders of a corporation to tender
their shares to him for purchase. This mode of procedure has, as the
authors point out, several advantages over the classical proxy contest.
There is, at least for the time being, far less regulation by the SEC.'
Aside from the cost of buying the shares tendered, the tender offer
is considerably less expensive than the proxy struggle. The contestants
avoid the acrimony and the tarnished images that often result from
hard-fought proxy contests. Finally, the tender offer is over and done
with more quickly.
But those representing management have, as might be expected,
found counter-moves to defeat the takeover bid or tender offer. In
order to avoid the unwanted suitor and perpetuate their own control,
management may try to make a match with any eligible partner.
Recently there have been several cases where shotgun mergers were
hurriedly arranged for no other purpose than to thwart tender offers.
The authors discuss this technique and others by which management
may attempt to frustrate tender offers. For example, business associates
of management can often be persuaded to buy the company's stock in
the market, thereby driving the market price up over the tender-offer
price and leaving the offer to die on the vine. Corporate funds are
employed to persuade shareholders not to succumb to the blandish-
ments of the tender offer. As with the proxy contest, numerous
maneuvers are conjured up by the fertile minds on both sides of the
takeover bid. The practicality and legality of these maneuvers are
discussed by the authors.
The proxy lawyer carries Proxy Contests around with him as a
tool of his profession. I recently had a conference with three other
7 PRoxy CONTESTS 585-99.
s But see recently enacted regulatory procedures, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 14(d), (e) & (f), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78n(d), (e) & (f) (Supp. 1969).
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lawyers in a pending proxy contest. As if in a Peter Arno cartoon,
each of us was armed with a copy of the book. We found it quite
useful for quick group research.
The proxy insurgent has been the object of much abuse at the
hands of smugly ensconced management. "Raider" is one of the more
printable epithets hurled at him. Name-calling is typical when the
corporate mighty are challenged, whether in a proxy fight or in a
stockholder suit, where the fashionable insult is "strike suitor." But
the truth is that the proxy contest is therapeutic for the body corporate,
and in the best tradition of corporate democracy.
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ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. By LEONARD W. LEVY.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. xii, 561. $12.50.
Milton Cantor I
"Legal development," Samuel Eliot Morison has written, "is
probably the least known aspect of American colonial history. Judicial
opinions were not recorded in the colonies, no year books were issued,
and the printed materials for legal and judicial history have been so
scanty as to preclude the more cautious historians from dealing with
this important side of colonial life; while less cautious historians have
indulged in generalization for which slight support can be found in
fact." ' Professor Morison's observations seem especially relevant
when one examines the transmission of legal culture and, especially,
of various procedural rights.
The application of English common and statutory law to a given
colony, the impact of frontier conditions upon such law, and the extent
to which the law of a colony was indigenous, are problems so complex,
so obscure, so resistant to analysis as to have deterred most investi-
gators. As Leonard Levy makes clear, the difficulties result from a num-
ber of factors, including the colony-to-colony variation in legal prin-
ciples and practices as well as the lack of court and statutory records.
Regarding the latter, it might be noted that while published sources
germane to the study of colonial law remain scarce, the situation is
being rectified. The nine volumes of American Legal Records,' ex-
tensive microfilming and publication programs, and significant mono-
graphs such as George Lee Haskins' Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts,' have begun to open judicial and legislative sources to
students of the subject, with a resulting increase in awareness of the
opportunities for investigation in this field.
But the specialist is still confronted by the unyielding and almost
insurmountable initial problem of diversity in legal principles and
institutions. This diversity makes it necessary to engage in a study
of individual colonies, which in turn leads to the disheartening con-
clusion that the colonies were by no means the neat, uncomplicated
t Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts. M.A. 1949, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. Ph.D. 1955, Columbia University.
IMorison, Records of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1681, unpaged preface to 29
COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSEtTS, PU1LCATIONS (S. Morison ed. 1933), quoted
in L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 334 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEVY].
2 E.g., CouRT REcoRDs OF PRINCE GEORGE'S CouNTY, MARYLAND, 1696-99 (J. Smith
ed. 1964).
3 G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960).
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societies some historians imagine them to have been. The findings of
a page-by-page and law-by-law examination of colonial legal doctrine
are in fact applicable only to the single colony examined.
The inability to generalize is, to be sure, as understandable as it
is discouraging. The colonies, after all, were not only separated from
the motherland by 3,000 miles of ocean, but also divided from one
another by natural obstacles that made communication hazardous if
not impossible. Consequently, localism was the dominant reality.
Each colony regarded itself as a disconnected and virtually autonomous
unit for the purpose of administration; each developed its own customs,
traditions, usages; and, therefore, each must be investigated separately.
In Origins of the Fifth Amendment, Professor Levy is sensitive
to colonial diversity. He recognizes that colonial legal culture is one
of paradoxes, inconsistencies, and divergencies. He is aware of the
lacunae in studies dealing with cisatlantic forms of English common
law, and has written a superb account which goes a long way toward
filling the gaps in our knowledge of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Professor Levy is conscious that the privilege, although essentially
modern, was not created ex nihilo in the seventeenth century. Its
roots lie deep in earlier thought and practices. Consequently, Pro-
fessor Levy quite properly goes to historical sources, tracing the
origin of the privilege back to the twelfth century and Henry II. He
renders an account of the evolving privilege from then to Elizabeth's
day and the Stuarts, always placing the development within its in-
extricable historical matrix. In illuminating the dark past of English
constitutionalism, Professor Levy shows how such related procedural
rights as trial by jury were shaped. In this connection, he explores
the manner in which the concept of judgment by peers according to the
law of the land took its place among what were later called "the im-
memorial rights of Englishmen." He explains the increasing sub-
stitution of jury verdicts for trial by battle; the importance of the
inquest, which eventually led England along a road very different from
that taken in Catholic lands, where the practice "left a trail of mangled
bodies, shattered minds, and smoking flesh"; 4 and the role of the
grand jury, which came to stand as a barrier between suspect and
attorney general, and which brought England close to recognizable
practices in criminal law by the fifteen century.
Not unmindful of European developments and their impact across
the Channel, Professor Levy discusses Papal policy, and illuminates
the distinctions between English and "Romish" practices in a master-
fully succinct section. The Fourth Lateran Council, he states, adopted
a new code of criminal procedure that included an oath of self-
incrimination in addition to procedures precursing the Holy Inquisi-
4 LEvY 20.
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tion,5 while English criminal trials became increasingly fair and
humane, especially after the Middle Ages. His conclusion is per-
suasive: England's legal and judicial practices were in "merciful
contrast" to those dominated by the Catholic hierarchy.6
England, to be sure, "had by no means embarked on an official
policy of toleration." I Professor Levy notes that torture was not un-
common in matters concerning the state's security, even though it had
never been recognized as legal by the common law. Furthermore, he
wisely distinguishes between torture and the threat of torture. He does
observe that torture remained in use in England, though it was em-
ployed more prudently than on the Continent, and never publicly. The
oath ex officio, it might be added, continued to be the prime method
of extorting evidence of heresy for four centuries after its introduction
in 1236.8 Sir Thomas More, who supported the oath as a method of
convicting heretics and protecting the Catholic faith,9 was put to death
when he refused to swear a similar oath recognizing Henry VIII in
place of the Pope as head of the Church of England."0 And the Catholic
restoration under Queen Mary was prosecuted by a commission that
was given complete procedural discretion except that it was expressly
commanded to use the oath ex officio."
Heresy as a capital crime died with Mary, although Professor
Levy rightly notes that Tyburn's gallows replaced Smithfield's fires.
But the Marian inquisition had "provoked the first widespread attempt
by criminal defendants-suspected heretics all-to refuse to answer
for fear of self-incrimination." 2
By the sixteenth century, the privilege against self-incrimination
had been identified with a Latin maxim familiar to Canon Law, iwmo
tenetur se ipsum prodere; that is, no one should be required to accuse
himself. Thomas More had based his refusal to take the oath of
supremacy on this maxim; but it was not given legal force until the
case of Thomas Leigh in 1568, when Chief Justice James Dyer invoked
5 LavY 20.
6 Livy 32.
7 Lrvy 83.
8 The oath ex officio, also called the oath de veritate dicenda, was the inquisitional
oath "to tell the truth to all interrogatories that might be administered . . . . The
accused, knowing neither the charges against him, nor his accusers, nor the evidence,
. must take the oath or be condemned as guilty, yet if he took the oath he exposed
himself to the nearly certain risk of punishment for perjury-and his lies were evidence
of his guilt--or condemned himself by admission which his judge regarded as damaging,
perhaps as a confession to the unnamed crime." LEvy 23-24.
9 LEvY 65.
10 Lwy 69. Professor Levy is careful to point out that More's refusal to swear
the oath of supremacy was not literally heresy, and was therefore not strictly analo-
gous to a refusal to take the oath ex officio. Id.
11 LEvy 76-77.
12 L= 77.
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the maxim in granting habeas corpus to a Catholic attorney imprisoned
for refusing to swear the oath ex officio."
There is little point in reviewing the lamentable story of Anglican
persecution and Puritan response. Suffice it to say that gradually,
through Dyer, Sir Thomas Tresham, and Robert Beale, the privilege
was becoming embedded in the English legal consciousness. Gradually,
too, a growing number of men linked the right against self-incrimina-
tion to Magna Carta. In 1590, John Udall claimed a legal right
against self-incrimination "at least in cases where the procedure did
not comport with Magna Carta," 14 which guaranteed judgment by
peers or by the law of the land.' According to Coke among others,
the privilege was at the vital center of Chapter 39, per legem terrae.
Their arguments, to be sure, were historically unsound, but what is
important is that Puritan lawyers generally challenged High Commis-
sion procedures as conflicting with the Great Charter, and charged that
the oath ex officio could not be reconciled with the implications of
"fundamental law," judicium parium vel per legem terrae. In the course
of their arguments they took a feudal document and converted it into
a talismanic symbol of freedom-the basis for English constitution-
alism. For a half century or more the Charter enjoyed what one
recent scholar has called "an Indian summer." 16 During the 1570's
and 80's the Puritans carried their cause into the political arena; and,
as Professor Levy shows in a series of thoughtful aperqus, they in-
voked the principles of Magna Carta in their speeches and legislation.
It was Coke, of course, who became the most outspoken stalwart
of the rule of law and the great champion of the privilege against self-
incrimination. His magnificent stand against royal prerogative, high-
lighted by the noble maxims from Bracton and the Magua Carta,
became an inspiration for the New World as well as the Old. Uphold-
ing the right of Burrowes and other Puritan laymen to refuse to take
the oath ex officio, Coke maintained that the oath need only be taken
in matrimonial and testamentary cases, though he never contested a
voluntary confession.
One figure alone matches Coke in his defense of the right against
self-incrimination: the militant Christian democrat and libertarian,
John Lilburne. Professor Levy fully appreciates Lilburne's struggle
for freedom of religion, speech, and press, and his contributions to
more humane and democratic criminal procedures. "Lilburne .
made the difference," and from his day the right against self-
13 Lvry 94-96.
14 LEvY 164-65.
15 Udall was the first defendant to invoke the privilege in a common law trial for
a capital crime (seditious libel).
16 W. Dunham, Jr., Magna Carta and British Constitutionalism, in THE GREAT
CirARR 32 (1965).
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incrimination was an established article of common law." More im-
portant, "the claim to a right against self-incrimination raised the
generic problem of the nature of sovereignty in England and spurred
the transmutation of Magna Carta from a feudal relic of baronial
reaction into a modern bulwark of the rule of law and regularized
restraints upon government power." 18
Two-thirds of Professor Levy's book is devoted to English
history. We are given a careful and lengthy account of the evolution
of the right against self-incrimination from the ecclesiastical courts of
the Middle Ages, through the Courts of High Commission and the
Star Chamber (in which the procedure for binding a person to answer
all interrogatories reached its climax), to the celebrated Penn-Mead
trial of 1667 and the trial of Francis Jenkes two years later, to the
virtual disappearance of the oath ex officio and compulsory extraction
of evidence. Professor Levy has set down the record in language of
exceptional vitality and precision, and with the scrupulous scholarship
characteristic of all his work. The Origins is critical, penetrating,
judicious, and irresistably intelligent. It recognizes that law is not
something separate from human behavior, and it gives us as much of
great events and high drama as it does of the privilege itself. For
Professor Levy sees the privilege as one factor in a set of fairly
explicit legal prescriptions, and he tells us about them against the
turbulent backdrop of English affairs. His is surefooted history:
concise in argumentation, rich in narrative, clean and adroit in style.
No one has ever examined the subject with comparable rigor and depth.
Surely, therefore, it is ungenerous to cavil. But I wish Professor
Levy had amplified one aspect of the institutional scene which he
neglects, namely, the judicial power struggle between the conciliar
court system and the regular courts for the administration and execu-
tion of royal policy (from Richard III to Henry VIII).
The conciliar court system utilized "suggestions" or "information"
in treason and felony cases. Common-law lawyers objected to the
examination procedure employed in Council and Chancery, especially
to the oath ex officio which, Professor Levy rightly tells us, derived
from canonical procedures and operated to compel suspected non-
conformists to answer truthfully all questions put to them before they
were informed of the charges against them. "[T]here can equally be
no doubt," declares E. M. Morgan (in a study unaccountably omitted
from Professor Levy's otherwise exhaustive bibliography), "that to
the common lawyers a system which required a person to furnish his
own indictment from his own lips under oath was repugnant to the
law of the land." '9 Professor Levy discusses the manner in which
1
7 LEvY 313.
is Lmry 331.
19 Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination., 34 Mum- L. Rwv 1, 9
(1949).
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High Commission shifted from its original policy as an administrative
appendage of the Privy Council and took on a distinctly new com-
plexion as one of the "Romish" conciliar courts. But he fails to
emphasize the effective concern of common-law lawyers-how they
vigilantly watched the Commission and how Puritan and lawyer made
common bond, with the former fighting Commission attempts to
enforce religious conformity and the latter seeking to restrict the
Commission's burgeoning jurisdiction and procedures, which were
clearly contrary to accepted due process."
A related set of institutional tensions that might profitably have
been explored involves the political implications of the privilege against
self-incrimination. It would have been a relatively simple chore to
set out these implications, since the Origins does present the historical
narrative: the rise of large towns and major trading centers, the impact
of the new society upon the development of the jury, and the changes
occurring in the administration of justice. Judicial controls were
slowly being centralized, with the royal courts-in both civil and crim-
inal cases-beginning to dominate a multitude of special jurisdictions
by the late fourteenth century. A power struggle of monumental
proportions occurred, according to Holdsworth, owing to the lack of
distinct jurisdictional lines, a heritage of the medieval court structure.
Court rivalry existed between Chancery and Admiralty on the one
hand and the common-law courts on the other. Indeed, after the late
fifteenth century, King's Bench and Common Pleas conducted a series
of jurisdictional privateering expeditions against any tribunal that
took business from them. Professor Levy neglects this competition
as well as the struggle between common-law and ecclesiastical tribunals
that gave the Puritans hope that the former courts would join their
cause.
There is, as might be expected, an admirably complete discussion
of how the Puritans, failing to obtain a common-law court alignment,
concentrated instead on the Charter and its symbolism in the belief
that it would ultimately bring Parliament to their side. Out of the
procedural mandates outlined in the fourteenth-century version of
Magna Carta came a more substantive understanding of the common
law and of the constitutional heritage of Englishmen. Professor Levy
does not fail us here, though he does not fully describe the efforts of
the common-law courts to curb the prerogative courts of Chancery,
Admiralty, High Commission and Requestes, or the common-law
courts' attempts to confine ecclesiastical and local jurisdictions. The
common-law courts, for example, were forever seeking to destroy,
2 0 According to Holdsworth and Glanville, the common-law courts sought to keep
ecclesiastical courts within jurisdictional bounds through the ancient writ of prohibi-
tion. As Professor Levy points out, the writ stopped all proceedings in the recipient
court pending a common-law court's decision whether the cause was lay or ecclesias-
tical. Lavy 217.
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erode, or restrict High Commission authority, and surely this is one
compelling reason for common-law objections on procedural grounds
to the oath ex officio, which dispensed with the regular indictment and
trial so integral to the common law.
The Puritans, being most immediately affected by High Com-
mission activities, understandably were most interested in finding and
enlarging upon common-law practices that would restrain these activi-
ties. Much the same thinking, I suspect, was influential in common-
law lawyers' objections to the ecclesiastical courts, where basic differ-
ences (not only jurisdictional rivalry) existed about what constituted
proper trial procedures, and to various regional administrative wings
of the Privy Council, such as the Councils of Wales and York.
After exploring the English background of the privilege against
self-incrimination, Professor Levy turns to American developments,
examining them with comparable rigor and penetration. Indeed, it is
Professor Levy's presentation of the American mise en scine, which
has not benefited from the luminous studies of Maitland and Holds-
worth, that most deserves the overworked encomium, "a major
contribution."
For some years now, there has been a major controversy among
American colonial legal historians over the extent to which English
common law was adopted in the colonies. Among those who profess
to find little adoption are George Wythe, in his monumental 1803
edition of Blackstone's Commentaries and, more recently, Paul Reinsch,
Roscoe Pound, and William T. Davis. On the other hand, Theodore
Plucknett, Julius Goebel, Herbert Pope and John T. Farrell find that
the English common law was adopted to a considerable degree. One
thing is clear: no all-inclusive generalization can be made, and all
claims and counterclaims must be scrutinized in the light of specific
legal realities in each colony. For instance, Professor Haskins' study
shows that Massachusetts dower law was based upon English rules,
common-law rules, but interpreted by Bay Colony courts in a manner
at variance with those rules.2' Hence the conclusion that the common
law was less significant than local customs in seventeenth-century
Massachusetts. In Virginia, the courts were bound in their decisions
by the common law of England, the Parliamentary statutes passed
prior to 1607, and the statutes enacted by the Virginia Assembly,'
but they relied to a great extent upon their own judgments for
guidance in arriving at decisions. In New York, English common law
predominated, fighting down the challenge of Dutch and Puritan forms,
although the Mayor's Court, which operated under Dutch rules, sur-
21 Haskins, Reception of the Common Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachu-
setts: A Case Study, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 842-53 (1949).
22 Ordinances of May, 1776, ch. 5, § 6, in 9 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE,
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAws OF VIRGINIA, 1619-1792, at 127 (1821).
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vived in New York City. Maryland's early legal history, like that
of New York, was a legal patchwork. Relying in part upon Chan-
cellor Kilty's extensive survey of English legal usage, Joseph Smith
has concluded that many Parliamentary acts were accepted as part of
Maryland's law.' But English common law and customs were also
influential, particularly in criminal cases and in administering manorial
justice.
The right against self-incrimination, Professor Levy declares,
evolved in America as part of the reception of the common law and
particularly of its accusatorial system. This is not to affirm that
unlike the common law, the right was easily or uniformly adopted;
quite the contrary, as Professor Levy concludes, "Its reception cannot
be taken for granted in any colony" and inconsistencies are the rule.'
Moreover, the evidence is so sparse that valid generalization is im-
possible. Like George Haskins, Professor Levy concludes that a
limited privilege against self-incrimination existed in Massachusetts,
embodied in the legal codes of 1641 and 1648. Both scholars note
the prohibition against torture to extract confessions, and Professor
Levy reiterates his finding that the abolition of torture is closely
linked to the establishment of the right. Both Professor Haskins and
Professor Levy also emphasize the importance of John Wheelright's
trial and the violent reaction to the General Court's attempt to bind
him by the oath ex officio.
In a survey of seventeenth-century usage Professor Levy con-
cludes that the right was also recognized in other colonies, but the
evidence is admittedly rather scarce. Virginia, for example, was one
of several colonies in which the origin of the right was shrouded in
mystery-with a reference cropping up only once, in the decade after
Bacon's Rebellion. Pennsylvania's record is clearer. William Penn,
the author of The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted was,
after all, co-defendant with William Mead in Old Bailey in 1670, and
tract and trial suggest that he highly valued the right against self-
incrimination. Professor Levy, confirming Erwin Griswold's account
of William Bradford's trial in Pennsylvania, describes how Bradford
sought to know his accusers and refused to incriminate himself. Sir
Thomas Lawrence, a judge and secretary of Maryland, claimed the
right in his trial for "high Crimes and Misdemeanours." ' Even
earlier, in a case that prefigured Sir Thomas' (and that Professor Levy
fails to mention), there is a record of conviction of a Negro and an
Indian who stood mute.
Professor Levy concludes that legal minds in colonial New York
were well aware of the neino tenetur maxim. Taking exception to the
=J. H. Smith, The Faudations of Law in Maryland: 1634-1715, in LAW AND
AuTHoRrry IN CoLONI A.ImcA 99 (G. A. Billias ed. 1965).24 LEvy 333.
25 LE-y 364-.
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finding of Goebel and Naughton, he categorically rejects their claim
"that the existence before the Revolution of a privilege of defendants
is an illusion." " Self-incrimination, Professor Levy insists, was no
exotic fruit of Westminister Hall. After a close analysis of provincial
law books used by New York attorneys and of the cases of Alexander
McDougall, Henry Townsend, and Sam Spicer, he makes a devastating
prima facie case for the existence of the privilege.
Other scholars have worked in the field of seventeenth-century
American legal history, exploring the adoption of Magna Carta in
colonial charters and the various cases in which judicial or legislative
bodies attempted to impose self-incrimination, but few have com-
mented upon the eighteenth century. Professor Levy fills the gap.
He brings to light the 1707 trial of Francis Makemie, in which the
New York governor attempted to induce Makemie's friends to incrim-
inate each other (though not themselves) ; the New York statute that
compelled suspected fur traders to take an oath of purgation, which
was a sworn statement of innocence; the refusal of Samuel Hemphill,
a Presbyterian minister, to deliver deistic sermons to the Philadelphia
synod, on the grounds that he had a right not to accuse himself; the
drumhead trial of two Pennsylvania Anglicans, notable for the tender
regard shown for the privilege against self-incrimination by the pro-
vincial Assembly, even though it grossly abridged most procedural
rights; and the opposition to the writs of assistance, which gave the
privilege a new respectability." Increasingly, the right against self-
incrimination came to be recognized, and Professor Levy argues that
it was firmly fixed in the law books and legal procedures of most
colonies even before the Revolution. The record remains incomplete,
but there is now sufficient evidence to establish the claim that the
right was well known to the average colonist by the early 1770's.
Indeed, colonies and motherland differed little if at all on the right
by 1776.
Professor Levy concludes his engrossing study with an exegetical
analysis of the state constitutions. Nearly all, he finds, followed the
memorable language of Virginia's Declaration of Rights. With typical
healthy irreverence he declares: "The history of the writing of the
first American bills of rights and constitutions simply does not bear
out the presupposition that the process was a diligent or systematic
one. Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were imitative,
deficient, and irrationally selective." 28 Carrying the story into the
26. GoEIE, JR. & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK:
A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776), at 656 (1944), quoted in LEVY 335.
= In this connection, Professor Levy lays to rest the claim that John Hancock
was "compelled to give evidence against himself," 0. DicKEsoN, THE NAVIGATION
AcTs AND THE AmmicAN REvLOUTION 244 (1951), quoted in LEVY 398, and points out
that Hancock's counsel, John Adams, "referred neither to the right against self-
incrimination nor to the illegality of writs of assistance" in his argument. LEvY 398.
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1780's, he tells us how the founders, Mason and Madison in particular,
shaped the right against self-incrimination and gave it status as an
independent libertarian statement in the fifth amendment.
Thus Professor Levy concludes his superlative book. If I have
felt compelled to take issue with a few points that he raises, I do not
wish to leave a negative impression. The study has abundant merits.
It is both definitive and a signpost, pointing the way for important
work in other areas of colonial law. One may cavil at times, and
another historian might have done sections differently, but I doubt
if there is one living who would have done it half as well.
28 LEvY 411.
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UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND
FOREIGN PERSONS. SECOND EDITION. By BORIS I.
BITTKER AND LAWRENCE F. EBB, WITH COLLABORATION OF
KENNETH M. DAVIDSON. Federal Tax Press, 1968. Pp. ix, 579;
tables and index. $12.50.
Roland L. Hjorth t
This book is the second version of a "preliminary edition" pub-
lished by the same authors in 1960. The original bore the title
Taxation of Foreign Income-Cases and MVlaterials. It included
foreign decisions, mostly from the United Kingdom and India, as well
as materials on United States law. Although the preliminary edition
emphasized taxation of income, it also gave attention to "sales, prop-
erty, inheritance and other taxes impinging on international (or
'transnational') transactions." 1 Transnational income taxation has in
intervening years become a matter of such scope and complexity that
attention to taxes other than income taxes within the scope of one
casebook has become increasingly unrealistic. Further, unless foreign
tax law materials are arranged in such a way that the student can see
the interrelationship between a foreign taxing system and our own,
the inclusion of foreign materials in a casebook on transnational taxa-
tion, while it may give the student a comparative perspective, will do
so at the expense of a thorough mastery of United States law.2
The present edition of the book largely discards foreign tax
materials and materials dealing with taxes other than income taxes.
The second edition is limited to the subject of its title: United States
taxation of foreign income and foreign persons. Stated somewhat
differently, the book is concerned wtih the basic problems involved in
taxing income derived from sources outside the country of which the
taxpayer is a resident or citizen. From the State's point of view,
"foreign income" can be placed in two categories: (1) income of the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B. 1957, University
of Nebraska; LL.B. 1961, New York University. Member, New York Bar.
I B. BImcRE & L. EBB, TAXATION OF FORmGN INcOME iii (prelim. ed. 1960).
2 In no area is the interrelationship of foreign and domestic law so important as in
transnational taxation. For example, the maximum amount of foreign tax that may
be credited against United States tax under INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 901 [hereinafter
cited as CODE] is that proportion of foreign taxes which foreign source income bears to
worldwide income. See CODE § 904(a). Thus, if India treats a portion of the profits
from the purchase of goods in India and the sale of those goods in the United States
as income partly from Indian sources, but the profits are treated under United States
law as exclusively from United States sources, a United States taxpayer might find
that none of the Indian tax may be credited. See J. Webb Sons & Co. v. Commissioner,
38 All India Rptr. 347 (1951) (Punjab). But the United States tax advisor will prob-
ably rely principally on foreign counsel for advice on foreign law. His concern be-
comes immediate only when foreign law affects the results under United States law, as
it can under the foreign tax credit.
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State's nationals (citizens, residents, or domestic. corporations)- from
sources outside the State; and (2) income of nonnationals (-nonresident
aliens. or foreign corporations) from sources, within-. the State. A
nation has the power to tax-the foreign income of its nationals;- It' also
has the power to tax the local income of -nonnationals. But -if -all
nations exercised their taxing powers to the fullest extent, all "foreign"
income of a taxpayer would be taxed twice. The study of -transnational
-taxation, then, is a study of the ways in which- nations separately (e.g.,
by a unilateral foreign tax credit) or jointly (e.g., by bilateral -tax
treaties) accommodate their legal systems ,to avoid double taxation,
without surrendering completely their powers to tax income that is
"foreign" as far as the taxpayer is concerned.
The United States has dealt with the basic problems of trans-
national taxation by adopting a complicated and detailed series of
statutes and supplementary bilateral tax conventions with other nations.
The Internal Revenue Code creates two distinct categories of tax-
payers, with separate rules for each. The first category includes
United States nationals (citizens, residents, and domestic corpora-
tions). As to these taxpayers, the taxing power of the United States
is complete: I all income, whether from domestic or foreign sources, is
included in the tax base.4 The United States protects its nationals
from double taxation by granting a foreign tax credit,5 and protects
itself against the depletion of revenues that might result from the
credit by entering into bilateral tax conventions limiting the foreign
taxation of United States nationals.' As to nonnationals, the United
States generally limits the imposition of its taxes to certain items of
income from United States sources, and even as to these items often
imposes a special tax rate which may be lower or higher than the
rates imposed on the income of nationals.' The limitations are con-
3 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
4 The Code does not expressly so provide. However since § 61 imposes a tax on
all income "from whatever source derived," it purports to tax the worldwide income
of all taxpayers. Taxpayers claiming complete or partial exemption must bring them-
selves under more specialized provisions, such as CODE §§ 871 ("Nonresident Alien
Individuals") and 881 ("Foreign Corporations Not Engaged in Business in United
States").
5 CODE§§ 901-06.
6 See, e.g., Convention with Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, CCH Tax Treaties
1ff 4403-23 [hereinafter cited as Japanese-American Income Tax Treaty]. Tax treatiespreserve United States revenues in the following manner. If the taxpayer's United
States effective tax rate is 407 and the normal foreign tax rate on his foreign source
income is also 40%, the United States collects no revenue in respect to the foreign
income because of the foreign tax credit. But if by treaty the foreign tax on such a
United States taxpayer's foreign income is reduced to 10%, see, e.g., Japanese-Ameri-
can Income Tax Treaty arts. VI, VIA & VII, the United States might be able to
collect as much as 75% of the revenue from the foreign income, notwithstanding the
tax credit.
7Income taxation of nonnationals was the main concern of the Foreign Investors
Tax Act of 1966. See CODE §§ 861-96.
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tained in both the Internal Revenue Code and the bilateral tax
conventions.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a third category of tax-
payer under United States law: the foreign corporation controlled by
United States taxpayers. Traditionally, all foreign corporations,
whether domestically controlled or not, have been treated as non-
nationals. But in some cases foreign incorporation is an artifice. To
enable United States taxpayers to avoid or postpone United States
taxation of foreign income by the simple expedient of foreign incor-
poration could nullify the basic rule that nationals are to be taxed
currently on all foreign income, subject to the foreign tax credit. The
taxation of controlled foreign corporations is understandably a difficult
problem. To date, the United States has confined itself to taxing
shareholders of controlled foreign corporations as if they were partners
owning direct interests in the foreign enterprise.8 Even this procedure
is limited to cases where foreign incorporation is utilized chiefly as a
means of tax avoidance. But it can be assumed that taxation by the
United States of the income of controlled foreign corporations is- in a
state of flux.
These basic problems of transnational taxation are not as clearly
set forth in the book as I had hoped they would be. Without an intro-
ductory statement of basic problems, organization of the materials in
an orderly, step-by-step manner that enables the student to appreciate
the interrelationship of the basic concepts involved is an almost im-
possible task.' The first chapter of the book does contain: (1) a 1923
League of Nations Report on Double Taxation," (2) excerpts from
articles dealing with policy in taxing foreign income," and (3) a
five page "Bird's Eye View" of the present United States statutory
and treaty framework dealing with income that is "foreign" as far
as the taxpayer is concerned." The statutory summary is concise, but
I do not believe it introduces students to the subject in a meaningful
way. In this case, a "Bird's Eye View" is not enough.
The remainder of the first chapter is concerned with "Juris-
dictional Foundations for Taxing Income." Chapter II deals with
"The 'Source' of Income." After this conceptual treatment, chapter
III moves to a functional approach in discussing "Competing Methods
of Engaging in Foreign Business and Investment." Chapters IV, V,
8 This is the approach adopted in CODE §§ 551-58 (foreign personal holding com-
panies) and §§ 951-64 (controlled foreign corporations).
9 A superb statement of the basic problems of transnational taxation, though some-
what out of date in some details, may be found in chapter nine of E. OwENs, THE
FoREIGN TAx CRaErr 518-92 (1961) ("Formulation of Income Tax Law With Respect
to Foreign Source Income").
1oB B TER & L. EBB, UNxiTz STATES TAXATION OF FOREiGN INCOME AND
FOREiGw PERsONs 1-14 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as BrrrxER & EBB].
1 BirER & EBB 15-25.
-2 Id. 26-30.
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and VI are concerned with "Income Tax Treaties," "Foreign Cur-
rency Problems," and "Enforcement Problems," respectively.
I. THE JURISDICTIONAL BASES
"Jurisdictional foundations for taxing income" depend on whether
the taxpayer is a national or a nonnational. As Cook v. Tait "s illus-
trates, the United States can tax its nationals on all income from
whatever source derived. Whether or not a taxpayer is a national
can be a troublesome issue,14 but most problems of jurisdiction relate
to the taxation of nonnationals, and the jurisdictional bases for taxing
nonnationals cannot be considered apart from sections 861 to 896 of the
Internal Revenue Code. It is these sections of the statute, and not
the cases selected by the editors, that determine how much of the
income of nonnationals will be taxed by the United States, and at
what rates. The cases included in the text are relevant to these
sections, but the relevance is often difficult to see, particularly since
many of the cases were decided under statutes no longer in force.
It would help the student to know, for example, that under section
871 the taxation of a nonresident alien individual depends upon
whether the individual is engaged in a trade or business within the
United States. If he is not, the United States taxes only certain types
of his income from United States sources (mainly "fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical [sic] gains, profits and income")," 5 at a
flat rate of 30 per cent of the gross amount or at a lower rate (5, 10 or
15 per cent) that may prevail under an applicable bilateral tax con-
vention."" If the taxpayer is engaged in a United States trade or
business, all income from United States sources is taxed at graduated
rates based on net income, except that "fixed or determinable annual
or periodical income" from United States sources may still be taxed
at a flat 30 per cent or lower treaty rate as long as such income is not
"effectively connected" with the operation of the United States trade
or business.' 7  No income from sources outside the United States is
taxed unless the nonresident alien has an "office or other fixed place
of business" within the United States,'8 in which case only certain
13265 U.S. 47 (1924) [BrrrxER & EBB 31].
14 The problems arise in determining whether an alien is a resident. See Com-
missioner v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 925 (1951)
[BrrrxER & EBB 34].
1 5 CODE § 871 (a) (1) (A).
16 See note 6 siq'ra. Under some treaties, this type of income may be tax exempt
See, e.g., Convention With the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income, arts. VII-VIII, CCH Tax
Treaties 1" 3003-24 [hereinafter cited as German-American Tax Treaty].
1 7 COE §864(c) (1).
18 COE §864(c) (4).
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items of foreign income connected with that business will be subjected
to United States tax.
Sections 871 and 881 (tax on foreign corporations) are the bases
for the United States taxation of nonnationals. They raise many
questions. What is meant by such terms as "trade or business within
the United States," "office or fixed place of business," income "from
sources within the United States," and "fixed or determinable annual
or periodical income"? The first and second chapters of the casebook
include cases interpreting each of these terms, but the cases all deal
with prior statutes fundamentally different from the statute now in
force. The material could have been presented more clearly through
an analytical discussion of the basic statutory framework relating to
taxation of nonnationals and a selection of cases more closely correlated
with existing statutes.
II. SOURCE OF INCOME
Cases dealing with the source-of-income concept are included
within a separate chapter, presumably because the concept serves "an
exclusively definitional function." '" Source of income is relevant to
all areas of transnational taxation, including one area not mentioned
by the editors, namely, determining the maximum limitations on the
foreign tax creditY° The book's treatment of source is thorough. In
dealing with income from sales, chapter II begins with a 1920 Opinion
of the Attorney General,' ruling that income from goods manufactured
or purchased in the United States and sold abroad is income from
sources outside the United States.' Following the opinion is a series
of cases illustrating that the place of sale is the place where title to the
goods passes.' The selection of cases dealing with "compensation for
labor" starts from the assumption that the proper source is the place
where the services are rendered and discusses the question whether an
item is compensation for labor or something else, for example, whether
royalties from the sale of artistic property are compensation or proceeds
from a sale; ' whether proceeds from a covenant not to compete are
1 9 BrrrKER & EBB 113.
20 The credit may not exceed that proportion of a United States national's total
United States tax which income from sources outside the United States bears to
worldwide income. CODE § 904(a) (2).
21 BrrR & EBB 114.
22The statute now provides that income from goods purchased in the United
States and sold abroad is income from sources outside the United States. CODE
§ 862(a) (6). Income from goods manufactured within (or without) the United States
and sold without (or within) the United States is treated as income from sources
partly within and partly without the United States. CODE § 863 (b) (2). An allocation
formula provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b) (2) (1957) is reproduced in BrrrxER &
EBB 143-45.
2 3 BrrrEmm & EBB 117-38.
2 Ingram v. Bowers, 47 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), [BrrrKER & EBB 155], aff'd,
57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932) [Brrrram & EBB 158].
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compensation for labor rendered in the country where the covenantor
has agreed not to compete; 2 and whether the premium given to a
foreign sister corporation by a United States corporation for the
privilege of serving the foreign corporation's foreign customers is
compensation to the foreign corporation for services rendered in the
United States. 6  In discussing the source of rents and royalties, the
book uses cases involving copyrights and "know-how." 27 The chapter
concludes with a treatment of the source of "Dividends and Interest,"
"Other Income," and a brief but good discussion of the "Source of
Deductions and Losses."
The weakness of chapter II is that the "definitional function"
served by the source rules is not clearly illustrated. Nor is this
"definitional function" clearly illustrated in other chapters of the book.
Source rules have prime importance in determining what income of non-
nationals the United States will tax. As noted above, source con-
siderations are also important in determining the maximum annual
foreign tax credit of a United States national. One who teaches a
course from this casebook must take care to illustrate the relation of
source rules to such matters as the taxation of nonnationals and the
foreign tax credit. The cases themselves do not do this, largely
because so many of them were decided under statutes that have either
been repealed or greatly modified. If no cases are available, perhaps
the editors could have drafted problems illustrating the application of
source rules to problems involving the Foreign Investors Tax Act
of 1966, the foreign tax credit, and Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporations.
III. FOREIGN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT METHODS
After discussing jurisdictional bases and source rules, the book
moves to a consideration of "Competing Methods of Engaging in
Foreign Business and Investment." 2 This is the longest chapter in
the book and considers, in somewhat haphazard order, "personal
residence abroad," the foreign tax credit, licensing agreements, Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporations, controlled foreign corporations, and
something called "Straws in the Wind." I say the organization is
haphazard because: (1) "personal residence abroad" seems to me to
relate as much to jurisdictional bases as to "competing methods of
2-Korfund Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1180 (1943) [BrrnKzz & EBB 161].
2 8British Timken Ltd. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 880 (1949) [Brriya & EBB
165].
2 1Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949) [Brrymn & EBB
172] (copyrights); Rev. Rul. 55-17, 1955-1 Cum. BuL.. 388 [Brrrn & EBB 177]
(know-how).
28Bmy- & EBB 193-380.
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engaging in business;" 1 (2) the foreign tax credit is discussed sep-
arately in two different places-first as it applies to foreign branches
and then, after an intervening forty-three pages dealing with non-
credit problems of foreign branches, as it applies to foreign subsidiaries;
and (3) controlled foreign corporations are considered first in a
general way, and then are considered specifically under various statutes,
after a discussion of the indirect tax credit of section 902.
I would have found chapter III more satisfactory if the editors
had first dealt with all aspects of the foreign tax credit, then discussed
controlled foreign corporations under one main heading, and finally
considered other problems arising in doing business abroad, for
example, license agreements and Western Hemisphere Trading
Corporations.
Foreign Tax Credit
Discussing the foreign tax credit only in the context of United
States corporations that conduct foreign business through branches or
subsidiaries does not reveal the true significance of the credit. As
far as United States nationals are concerned, the foreign tax credit is
the most important aspect of transnational taxation. If one had to
explain the dominant feature of United States taxation of the foreign
income of its nationals, one would say that all income, whether from
domestic or foreign sources, is included in the tax base, but a credit
against United States income taxes is allowed for foreign income taxes
paid or accrued, in an amount not exceeding that proportion of United
States income tax which foreign income bears to world-wide income.
The significance of the credit is not limited to corporations having
foreign branches or subsidiaries. It applies also to persons who work
abroad, who own foreign stocks or bonds, or who license intellectual
property to foreign licensees. Moreover, the foreign tax credit has a
direct bearing on other provisions of Subchapter N and on bilateral
tax treaties. For example, the foreign tax credit could make a pro-
vision of a bilateral tax treaty exempting certain foreign income of a
United States national (or a provision providing lower rates of tax
on foreign income) irrelevant to the taxpayer in some cases.30 The
29 The exemption from United States tax of certain earned income from sources
outside the United States, as provided in CODE § 911, is a statutory exception to the
basic rule expressed in Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924), that all income of United
States nationals, from whatever source, is subject to United States tax. If the editors
had chosen to include jurisdictional rules relating to United States nationals as an
introduction to the foreign tax credit, a discussion of § 911 at this point in the book
might have been appropriate.
80 For example, a taxpayer whose effective United States tax rate is 40% and
who has an item of foreign income subject to a foreign tax of 40% may not be bur-
dened by the foreign tax if it may all be credited. Thus, a treaty reducing the foreign
tax rate on his foreign income to 10% or 20% is of little interest to him. On the other
hand, if the income subject to foreign tax is not considered to be from foreign sources
under United States source-of-income rules, the treaty will have great significance.
The same would be true if the taxpayer had other income subject to a foreign tax of
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organization of the material tends to conceal the pervasive significance
of the foreign tax credit.
I also differ with the editors' choice of emphasis. While almost
forty pages are devoted to the question what is a creditable tax,"' only
five pages are devoted to the limitations of section 904.82 Perhaps only
a lack of sophistication prevents me from seeing the logic of this
emphasis. The editors could say, for example, that as a result of
(1) reduced taxes on certain foreign income covered by treaties,
(2) the credit carryover provisions of section 904(d), and (3) the
alternative "per-country" and "overall" limitations of section 904(a),
there are, for all practical purposes, no limitations on the credit as
far as corporate taxpayers with far-flung international operations are
concerned. Such taxpayers can arrange to have enough low-taxed
foreign income (royalties, interest, etc.) to combine with high-taxed
foreign income and make all foreign taxes creditable. For these tax-
payers, the truly significant question may be whether the foreign tax
is an income tax that they have paid. But if this is the reasoning
underlying the editors' selection of material, I would have liked to
see some evidence of it.
Controlled Foreign Corporations
With the exception of a discussion of the indirect credit of section
902 33 and a brief consideration of the accumulated earnings tax as
applied to foreign corporations, 4 all material under the heading "The
Foreign Corporation" deals with foreign corporations that are con-
trolled in fact. This portion of chapter III commences with a fable
ridiculing present tax treatment of controlled foreign corporations and
suggesting that the separate existence of foreign corporations owned
and managed in the United States should be ignored. 5 The fable is
followed by cases dealing with international corporate reorganizations,"6
an unsuccessful attempt at profit reallocation under section 269,m~ anda successful attempt at profit reallocation under section 4829 Next
60%. A treaty reducing the tax rate on some of the income to 20% might enable the
taxpayer to credit all foreign taxes paid by utilizing the "overall" limitation of CODE
§ 904(a) (2).
31 BrrTKR & EBB 210-49. An additional 20 pages deal with taxes "in lieu of'
income, "etc." taxes, and "who paid" the foreign tax. Id. at 249-69.
32 Id. at 269-74.
33 Id. at 319-27.
34 Id. at 327-28.
35 Roberts, From the Thoughtful Tax Man, 40 Taxes 355 (1962), cited as The
Talisman in BiTTER & EBB 279-81.
36 Hay v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 863
(1944) [BiTrRa & EBB 281].
37 Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966) [BrrTyER & EBB 292].
38 Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 645 (1935) [BITTyr & EBB 298]. This case arose under the predecessor of
CODE § 482, § 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 806.
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coi6ea case -illustrating a typical tax haven operation,' an obscure
case that presumably illustrates the operation of the foreign personal
holding company tax,4° and, finally, a ten-page discussion of Subpart F.
41
Again, I have difficulty understanding the editors' emphasis. For
exarhiple, seven pages are devoted to an obscure point under the foreign
personal holding company provisions, while only ten pages are devoted
to all of Subpart F and related provisions. More important, I am not
sure the chapter deals with the problem of controlled foreign cor-
porations in a cohesive manner. The syllogism is easily stated:
United States nationals are taxed on income from sources without the
United States but foreign nationals are not; corporations incorporated
abroad (foreign corporations) are foreign nationals; therefore, foreign
corporations are not taxed on income from sources outside the United
States. Although the syllogism expresses existing law, 42 its minor
premise can be unrealistic in certain cases. To permit United States
nationals who own foreign businesses to avoid or at least postpone
United States tax on the profits of those businesses by the simple ex-
pedient of incorporating abroad puts a premium on form at the
expense of revenue. Yet to attempt to tax the foreign corporation
directly would in some cases be impossible 43 and would be unfair if a
minority of the foreign corporation's shareholders were themselves
foreign nationals.
There are only two ways to deal with controlled foreign cor-
porations: (1) examine scrupulously the dealings of the foreign cor-
poration with its United States parent to ensure that disproportionate
profits are not attributed to the foreign corporation, and (2) tax the
United States shareholders directly on their shares of the foreign
corporation's profits. The Internal Revenue Service does examine
intercorporate dealings where foreign corporations are involved and
applies section 482 to reallocate profits in cases of abuse. But it has
been reluctant to tax United States shareholders on their respective
shares of foreign corporate profits. Application of such a tax across
3 9 Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 165,281 (1965)
[BrrTKER & EBB 301].40 Alvoid v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1960) [Brrrxm & EBB 329].
After 4 pages of extremely complicated facts we learn that a shareholder of a foreign
personal holding company will not be taxed on current profits when the Internal
Revenue Service blocks the payment of dividends.
41 BrrrKER & EBB 338-48. The description is a brilliant and concise summary
taken from B. BITTxER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 258-71 (2d ed. 1966). Those who already have an appreciation of
tax-haven corporations and Subpart F may understand it
42 With the modification that foreign source income that is "effectively connected"
with the conduct of a United States trade or business may be included in the United
States tax base if the nonnational has a permanent establishment in the United States.
CODE § 864(c) (4) (B) & (C).
43 As, for example, where the foreign corporation has no assets within the United
States. Foreign courts will not enforce tax claims of the United States even if those
claims are reduced to a judgment. United States v. Harden, 41 D.L.R.2d 721 (Sup.
Ct. Can. 1963).
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the board would deny the tax benefits of incorporation to United States
shareholders, for they would be taxed as partners of any business
incorporated abroad. Applying such a tax even in limited circum-
stances creates a host of technical difficulties, and the United States
has by no means applied it extensively. United States shareholders
have been taxed on foreign corporate profits only where it has appeared
that the prime purpose of foreign incorporation has been tax avoidance.
But, as noted above, the law in this area is probably in a state of flux.
The Code does not reflect a clear and consistent approach to the prob-
lem of controlled foreign corporations, and one can say that the book
under review reflects existing law once one concedes that the present
approach of the Code to controlled foreign corporations is scattershot
and confused."
IV. TAx TREATIES
Chapter IV deals with bilateral income tax conventions between
the United States and other countries. It includes the text of the
Income Tax Treaty Between Germany and the United States, cases
interpreting various clauses contained in tax treaties, and the text of
the OECD Draft Taxation Convention. As an exposition in isolation
of income tax treaties and their provisions, the chapter is excellent.
It does not, however, reflect the close interrelationship between income
tax treaties and Internal Revenue Code provisions. Some of these
interrelationships have already been mentioned.45
For example, treaties obviously modify those Code provisions
taxing the United States income of foreign nationals. The Code may
impose a tax of 30 per cent on United States royalty income paid to
nonnationals, but a treaty may reduce that tax to 10 per cent,4 or
44 Other aspects of this chapter deal with Western Hemisphere Trade Corpora-
tions, BrrTKER & EBB 348-73, licensing arrangements, id. 276-78, and "Straws in the
Wind," id. 375-80. "Straws in the Wind" concerns the "Boggs Bill," which is prob-
ably a dead letter.
4 5 See note 30 supra and accompanying text. The interrelationship of treaties and
the foreign tax credit may be illustrated by the following example. Taxpayer is a
United States national who has a permanent establishment in Germany. In 1966,
taxpayer's effective United States tax rate was 30%. The German source profits of
taxpayer amounted to $10,000 and were subjected to German income taxes of $5,000.
Taxpayer had no other income from sources outside the United States. Only $3,000
of the German tax could be credited because of the limitations of CoDE § 904 (a).
In 1967, taxpayer obtained a German patent and licensed it to a German licensee,
obtaining $10,000 in royalties in 1967. Taxpayer also earned $10,000 from the operation
of his German establishment. The royalty income was not effectively connected with
the profits attributable to the permanent establishment. Under the German-American
Tax Treaty, article VIII, supra note 16, at 1 3011, Germany would not tax the royalty
income. But taxpayer might nevertheless claim that his total income from German
sources was $20,000, reducing his effective German tax rate to 25%, and making all
German taxes creditable. The taxpayer would probably be successful. See Rev. Rul.
54-15, 1954 Cum. BuL. 129. On the other hand, if the treaty incorporated a "force of
attraction" theory, as treaties with some other countries do, the existence of a German
establishment would taint the unconnected royalty income, leading to a German tax of
$10,000 (assuming constant rates), of which only $6,000 could be credited.
46 See Japanese-American Income Tax Treaty, art. VII, supra note 6, at 1f 4410.
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eliminate it completely, as does the treaty between the United States
and Germany.47  It is perhaps less obvious that United States tax
treaties reflect internal law as much as they modify it. Most United
States tax treaties were drawn, for example, when the "force of
attraction" principle prevailed under internal law. Tax treaties adopted
the same principle: the existence of a permanent establishment within
the United States made all other United States income of a foreign
national ineligible for the special exemptions or low rates provided by
the treaty, even if the other income was not connected with the
permanent establishment.4 Now that the "force of attraction" prin-
ciple has been at least partly abandoned under internal law,49 it is
logical to expect that tax treaties will be revised to enable a foreign
national to claim exemptions and special rates even if he has a per-
manent establishment in the United States.'
Tax treaties are not self-contained. Neither are the foreign tax
credit provisions, the provisions relating to "source" rules, or the
provisions relating to the taxation of nonnationals. All are inter-
related, and at some point the interrelationships should have been
exhibited in the book. The editors could have shown them in the
material on tax treaties, but did not do so.
V. FOREIGN CURRENCY
Chapter V deals with problems arising from the use of foreign
currency in business and investment transactions. This is a trouble-
some area, and the chapter well illustrates the confusion and incon-
sistency that often result when tax law develops with few or no
statutory guidelines. Certain rules can be deduced from statutes of
general applicability. Dealers in foreign exchange realize ordinary
gain or loss on exchange transactions, and may inventory foreign
exchange at the lower of cost or market."- Casual speculators and
investors may treat foreign exchange as capital assets, the gain or loss
on which is recognized only when the exchange is converted into
another currency.52 But vexing problems arise when persons who
are neither dealers nor speculators use foreign exchange in their
business or investment activities. These taxpayers must decide whether
47 German-American Tax Treaty, art. VIII, supra note 16, at 13011.
4 85See, e.g., Japanese-American Income Tax Treaty, art. VII, supra note 6, at
114410.
4 9 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
60 The "force of attraction" principle was abandoned in a 1965 amendment to the
treaty between the United States and Germany. It has also been abandoned in the
new Convention with the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Property, CCH Tax Treaties 111 2839-46L.
51 irrrxm & EBB 488.
52 Mere appreciation in value is not taxed, and depreciation in value is not de-
ductible, until the gain or loss is "realized" by a "sale or other disposition" of property.
CODE §§ 1001-02.
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exchange transactions are to be separated from underlying business or
investment transactions, and if so, how, and whether the separate
exchange profit or loss is capital or ordinary. These questions are
raised in this book, and although the materials give the student no
more than an introduction into the area, I believe they are adequate
for a general course in transnational income taxation.
53
VI. CONCLUSION
This book is a typical casebook, containing a collection of cases and
articles supplemented by the editors' notes. To the extent that
statutes are dealt with directly, they are summarized rather than
analyzed. The editors include long and detailed cases on obscure
points of law, but neglect or give superficial attention to matters I
consider to be of major importance. The treatment of the foreign tax
credit is shallow; there is no comprehensive discussion of the Foreign
Investors' Tax Act of 1966; international corporate reorganizations
are virtually ignored; section 482 is given only passing attention;
licensing agreements are discussed in two pages; " and the treatment
of controlled foreign corporations under Subpart F merits only a ten-
page discussion borrowed from a corporate tax handbook. At the
same time, eight pages are devoted to an obscure case under the
foreign personal holding company tax " and eleven to a case involving
the attempted collection of tax from a Uruguayan taxpayer.56 I do
not mean to minimize the importance of cases, but additional editing
might have provided space to explore other matters more intensively.
Another weakness of the book is its failure to pull together con-
cepts that cannot be considered in isolation. One cannot plan a trans-
national joint venture, for example, without examining sections 351
and 367, foreign tax credit provisions, source rules, and tax treaties,
not only separately but as they affect each other.57 The interplay of
6 3 The last chapter covers such problems as withholding, returns and information,
collection, sailing permits, and foreign enforcement or non-enforcement of United
States tax claims.
64 BrrnKa & EBB 276-78.
5 Alvord v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1960) [Br-rTER & EBB 329-35].
&6 United States v. First Nat' City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) [BrrER & EBB
549-59].
57 Assume, for example that a United States taxpayer wishes to transfer low basis
technology to a foreign corporation in return for stock. The taxpayer's first concern
is whether the gain on the transfer will be recognized. Nonrecognition requires not
only qualification under CODE § 351, but prior clearance under CODE § 367. If the gain
is recognized under United States law, the taxpayer may find that the gain is taxed as
ordinary income under CODE § 1249. If the gain is not recognized under United States
law, but is taxed abroad, the taxpayer may find that as a result of the interplay of the
foreign tax credit limitations of § 904 or the source rules of §§ 861-64, none of the
foreign tax on the gain may be credited. On the other hand, if the taxpayer has in-
come from other countries taxed at very low foreign rates because of treaty limitations,
he may be able to credit the foreign tax imposed on the incorporation of the technology
by resorting to the "overall" limitation of CODE § 904(a) (2).
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statutes and their relation to tax treaties affects all but the simplest of
transnational transactions. The organization and content of the book
do not reflect the extreme degree of interdependence among the sources
of law in this area. However, this weakness can be overcome by
using transnational problems that require the student to pull together
the applicable statutes, treaties, and cases.
The present book is a substantial improvement over the first
edition. It is not my idea of perfection, but I know of no better
single source of materials for use in teaching a course on transnational
taxation. Professors may wish to supplement it with additional ma-
terials in specific areas, and with problems or other materials designed
to aid students in the study of statutes. But with such supplements,
teachers should have ample material for a stimulating course in what
I consider to be a fascinating area of law.
